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REDRESS IN STATE POSTCONVICTION
PROCEEDINGS FOR INEFFECTIVE
CRIMMIGRATION COUNSEL
Christopher N. Lasch*

INTRODUCTION
In its 2010 decision in Padilla v. Kentucky,1 the U.S. Supreme Court
held the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel in
criminal cases includes the right to receive counsel on whether a guilty
plea is accompanied by a risk of deportation.2 But in 2013, the Court
took back some of what it had given. Although most Padilla claims
properly arise in postconviction litigation initiated after the expiration
of direct review,3 in Chaidez v. United States the Court held that Padilla had announced a “new rule” of constitutional criminal procedure
that would not be retroactively applied to cases already final on direct
review.4
The Supreme Court has been clear, however, that its Teague5 antiretroactivity rule—the rule the Court applied in Chaidez to bar ret* Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; J.D., Yale Law School;
A.B., Columbia College. My thanks go to Denver Law for my pre-tenure leave, during which
significant work was accomplished on this Article. I also owe a special debt to César
Cuauhtémoc Garcı́a Hernández, who invited me to participate in an online symposium on
Chaidez, for his blog crImmigration. I learned a great deal from the other symposium panelists,
and gained special insight into Chaidez in the process of crafting my three posts: Symposium:
Chaidez and the Crumbling Foundations of the Teague Rule, CRIMMIGRATION (Nov. 1, 2012, 4:04
AM), http://crimmigration.com/2012/11/01/chaidez-and-the-crumbling-foundations-of-theteague-rule.aspx; Symposium: Chaidez—An Opportunity for the Court to Continue Its Path
Away from “Antitretroactivity” and Toward “Redressability,” CRIMMIGRATION (Nov. 5, 2012,
4:01 AM), http://crimmigration.com/2012/11/05/symposium-chaidezan-opportunity-for-the-courtto-continue-its-path-away-from-antiretroactivity-and-toward-redressability.aspx; Chaidez: Ignoring Precedent & Procedural Posture, CRIMMIGRATION (Feb. 26, 2013, 9:04 AM), http://crimmigration.com/2013/02/26/chaidez-ignoring-precedent—procedural-posture.aspx. I am also
indebted to Giovanna Shay, who contributed valuable suggestions and insights. Finally, my exploration of Padilla’s retroactivity while authoring, as counsel of record, a number of amicus
briefs on behalf of legal scholars during 2013 and 2014 (including on the Baret, Ramirez, Sylvain,
and Thiersaint cases discussed herein), was deeply informed and constantly renewed by my
thoughtful clients. Of course, any problems that remain are solely my own.
1. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
2. Id. at 374.
3. See infra Part IV.A.2.b.
4. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013).
5. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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roactive application of Padilla—does not bind the states.6 Instead,
states are free to craft their own rules for determining when the violation of a “new” constitutional rule will entitle a defendant to redress
in state postconviction proceedings.7 As of this writing, the highest
courts in eight states have addressed Padilla retroactivity after
Chaidez,8 and two others—in Connecticut9 and New York10—are currently considering the question. This Article explains why state courts
6. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008).
7. See id. at 282.
8. Massachusetts determined, as a matter of state law, that Padilla did not announce a “new”
constitutional rule, and therefore the state’s antiretroactivity rule was not implicated. Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 995 N.E.2d 760, 770 (Mass. 2013) (discussed infra Part IV.B.1). New Mexico
recently joined Massachusetts in holding that the right to effective crimmigration counsel is not
new. Ramirez v. State, No. 33,604, 2014 WL 2773025 (N.M. June 19, 2014) (discussed infra notes
242–254 and accompanying text). Iowa, Maryland, Nebraska, South Carolina, South Dakota,
and Texas, consistent with Chaidez, held that Padilla is not retroactive. Trong Duc Luong
Nguyen v. State, No. 11-0549, 2013 WL 1170326, at *2 (Iowa Mar. 22, 2013) (per curiam); Miller
v. State, 77 A.3d 1030 (Md. 2013); State v. Osorio, 837 N.W.2d 66, 69–70 (Neb. 2013); Hamm v.
State, 744 S.E.2d 503, 505 (S.C. 2013); State v. Garcia, 834 N.W.2d 821, 826 (S.D. 2013); Ex Parte
De Los Reyes, 392 S.W.3d 675, 676 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The Maryland decision in Miller was
particularly noteworthy, as it overturned the Court of Appeals’ pre-Chaidez decision Denisyuk
v. State, which held, as a matter of state law, that Padilla should be retroactively applied in all
cases involving a guilty plea after April 1, 1997, the effective date of the enactment of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, which Padilla identified as “dramatically rais[ing] the stakes of a noncitizen’s criminal conviction.” Denisyuk v. State, 30 A.3d
914, 925 (Md. 2011) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010)).
Nevada has touched on the issue of Padilla retroactivity only in unpublished opinions that lack
precedential value. It is unclear whether it is significant that although prior to Chaidez the Supreme Court of Nevada scrupulously avoided reaching the merits of Padilla retroactivity, e.g.,
Canedo v. State, No. 58992, 2012 WL 1252964 (Nev. Apr. 11, 2012); Velasco v. State, No. 59403,
2012 WL 1655978 (Nev. May 9, 2012), after Chaidez the court has explicitly stated (in unpublished opinions) that Padilla is not retroactive. E.g., Frias v. State, No. 60641, 2013 WL 1092449
(Nev. Mar. 14, 2013); Leon v. State, No. 61816, 2013 WL 3231638 (Nev. June 13, 2013). But cf.
Trujillo v. State, 310 P.3d 594, 596 (Nev. 2013) (published decision in which the Nevada Supreme
Court left unaddressed the lower court’s conclusion that Padilla applies retroactively).
In a case decided prior to Chaidez, the New Jersey Supreme Court determined as a matter of
state law that Padilla would not be retroactively applied. State v. Gaitan, 37 A.3d 1089, 1109
(N.J. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1454 (2013). The court noted, however, that New Jersey
precedent predating Padilla recognized that counsel who provides affirmative misadvice to a
client about the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction may render ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 1109. Thus, the court recognized that Padilla retroactivity was only at
issue to the extent Padilla enlarged the right to effective assistance of counsel. Id.; cf. Medina v.
State, No. 59491, 2012 WL 4041326 (Nev. Sept. 12, 2012) (citing Rubio v. State, 194 P.3d 1224,
1232 (2008)); People v. Kazadi, 284 P.3d 70, 73 (Colo. App. 2011) (noting that “even if Padilla
announced a new rule under federal law, Colorado law . . . has long recognized the very duties
that the Supreme Court discussed in Padilla”), aff’d, 291 P.3d 16 (Colo. 2012); see also Jeffrey L.
Fisher & Kendall Turner, The Retroactivity of Padilla After Chaidez v. United States, CHAMPION,
Mar. 2013, at 43, 44 (arguing that “defendants who can show that their attorneys misled them
regarding deportation consequences of their pleas can argue that they are entitled to relief on
collateral review, notwithstanding Chaidez”).
9. In Thiersaint v. Warden, No. CV104003350S, 2012 WL 6786081, at *11 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Dec. 7, 2012), the state habeas court held Padilla should be retroactively applied. The warden
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considering claims properly raised for the first time in state postconviction proceedings should grant redress for violations of the Padilla
rule.11
Part II discusses “crimmigration” and the rise of the right to effective crimmigration counsel. Crimmigration—the expanded linking of
the criminal and immigration justice systems since 1986—was the
backdrop for the Padilla decision holding that the Sixth Amendment
requires defense counsel to provide adequate advice concerning the
immigration consequences of a criminal plea.12 Part III recounts how
the Court lost its will to enforce the Padilla right, as evidenced by the
Chaidez decision holding the Padilla rule would not be retroactively
applied to convictions already final when Padilla was announced. Understanding Chaidez requires some background, Part III first examines the Supreme Court’s Griffith and Teague rules for applying
“new” rules of constitutional criminal procedure, briefly discussing the
theoretical underpinnings of those rules, and then turns to the Court’s
reframing of retroactivity as “redressability” in Danforth v. Minnesota. The final subpart of Part III discusses the Court’s decision in
Chaidez holding Padilla to be a new rule subject to Teague’s bar on
applying such new rules in collateral attack proceedings.
Part IV briefly introduces two of the cases in which Padilla retroactivity was recently litigated in state supreme courts, and then examines
the specific ways in which the policies underlying the Griffith/Teague
appealed, No. AC 35371 (Jan. 23, 2013), and the appeal was transferred to the Connecticut Supreme Court, No. SC 19134, on April 15, 2013. The case was argued on April 29, 2014.
10. In People v. Baret, 952 N.Y.S.2d 108 (App. Div. 2012), New York’s First Department concluded that
Padilla did not establish a “new” rule under Teague; rather, it followed from the clearly
established principles of the guarantee of effective assistance of counsel under Strickland and “merely clarified the law as it applied to the particular facts.” Rather than
overrule a clear past precedent, Padilla held that Strickland applies to advice concerning deportation, whether it be incorrect advice or no advice at all.
Id. at 110 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Orico, 645 F.3d 630, 639 (3d Cir. 2011)).
The New York Court of Appeals granted the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal on
June 5, 2013. People v. Baret, 993 N.E.2d 1275 (N.Y. 2013). The case was argued on May 1,
2014.
11. For other treatments of this question, see, for example, Rebecca Sharpless & Andrew
Stanton, Teague New Rules Must Apply in Initial-Review Collateral Proceedings: The Teachings
of Padilla, Chaidez and Martinez, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 795 (2013); Fisher & Turner, supra note
8; Kara B. Murphy, Comment, Representing Noncitizens in Criminal Proceedings: Resolving Unanswered Questions in Padilla v. Kentucky, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1371 (2011); Alison
Syré, Note, Padilla v. Kentucky: Bending Over Backward for Fairness in Noncitizen Criminal
Proceedings, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 677 (2012).
12. I use the terms “crimmigration advice” or “crimmigration counsel” to refer to the lawyer’s
performance in counseling her client with respect to the immigration consequences of a criminal
conviction.
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rules are different when applied in state postconviction proceedings.
Because the finality concerns driving the Teague antiretroactivity rule
are either absent or weakly present, and because the concerns underlying the Griffith rule of redressability—concerns with providing a forum for constitutional claims and treating similarly situated litigants
equally—are strongly present, Part IV concludes that the Griffith rule,
and not the Teague rule, should govern in state postconviction
proceedings.
Part V considers a question left open in Chaidez: whether the Padilla rule should be considered a “watershed” rule, subject to an exception on Teague’s bar to redress.13 Because Padilla should be
considered a watershed rule, even state courts that adhere to Teague
ought to grant redress for violations of the Padilla rule, even if the
violation predated Padilla. Part VI concludes by briefly examining
how the crimmigration context in which Padilla retroactivity is being
litigated may impact judicial decision making.
II. CRIMMIGRATION AND THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
CRIMMIGRATION COUNSEL
A. The Rise of Crimmigration
In 2006, Juliet Stumpf coined the term “crimmigration,” describing
the “merger” of criminal law and immigration law that had been occurring with increased intensity since the late 1980s as a “crimmigration crisis.”14 Crimmigration has many facets,15 but the one that
ultimately caught the Court’s eye in Padilla was the harnessing of the
13. See Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1107 n.3 (2013).
14. Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM.
U. L. REV. 367 (2006) [hereinafter Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis]. For other scholarly contributions to the “crimmigration” literature, see, for example, Juliet P. Stumpf, Doing Time:
Crimmigration Law and the Perils of Haste, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1705, 1720–21 (2011); Jennifer M.
Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135 (2009) [hereinafter Chacón, Managing Migration]; Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827 (2007); Jennifer M.
Chacón, Whose Community Shield?: Examining the Removal of the “Criminal Street Gang Member,” 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 321–24; Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U.
L. REV. 1281 (2010); Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of
the Post-September 11th “Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 639 (2004); Stephen H.
Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice
Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007); Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between
Immigration and Crime Control After September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81 (2005);
Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611 (2003).
15. Jennifer Chacón, for example, describes “three distinct trends: the increasingly harsh criminal consequences attached to violations of laws regulating migration, the use of removal as an
adjunct to criminal punishment in cases involving noncitizens, and the rising reliance on criminal
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criminal justice system by the immigration justice system.16 Between
1986 and 2009 (the year before Padilla was decided), deportations
jumped from 24,592 to 393,289.17 This tenfold rise in deportations was
largely made possible by the construction of an effective pipeline from
the criminal justice system to the immigration system. While in 1986
criminal violations resulted in only 1,978 deportations (accounting for
about 3% of total deportations),18 in 2009 that number had grown
nearly 65 times, with 128,345 criminally based deportations19 (accounting for nearly 33% of the total).20 The legal structures of this
pipeline included both an increase in the number of crimes considered
grounds for deportation and the creation of legal mechanisms for
shuttling immigrants from the hands of criminal justice officials into
those of immigration officials.
Stumpf and others have thoroughly documented the steady proliferation of criminal grounds for deportation since 1988.21 The Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988 created the “aggravated felony” category of crimes
that trigger deportation, and Congress has repeatedly expanded the
definition.22 And in 1996, Congress made drug crimes, and even a
single “crime involving moral turpitude,” deportable offenses.23
While widening the net to bring many more criminal defendants into
immigration proceedings, Congress also took steps to limit the discretion of immigration officials, both with respect to the detention of suslaw enforcement actors and mechanisms in civil immigration proceedings.” Chacón, Managing
Migration, supra note 14, at 135–36 & nn.2–4 (footnotes omitted).
16. César Cuauhtémoc Garcı́a Hernández, in his article Criminal Defense After Padilla v.
Kentucky, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 475, 479–87 (2012), puts Padilla in its context more thoroughly
than I do here, and I commend readers to his analysis.
17. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2009 YEARBOOK
OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 95 tbl.36 (2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2009/ois_yb_2009.pdf.
18. MARY DOUGHERTY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2004, at 6 (2005), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/AnnualReportEnforcement2004.pdf.
19. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 17, at 103 tbl.38.
20. In fiscal year 2011, criminally based deportations had risen to 48%. JOHN SIMANSKI &
LESLEY M. SAPP, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2011,
at 6 (2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-statistics/
enforcement_ar_2011.pdf.
21. See, e.g., Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis, supra note 14, at 382–84; Yolanda Vázquez,
Perpetuating the Marginalization of Latinos: A Collateral Consequence of the Incorporation of
Immigration Law into the Criminal Justice System, 54 HOW. L.J. 639, 655–57 (2011).
22. Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis, supra note 14, at 383 (citing Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988 (Drug Kingpin Act), Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469).
23. Id. (citing Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 435, 110 Stat. 1214, 1277 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2012)); see also Alina Das,
Immigration Detention: Information Gaps and Institutional Barriers to Reform, 80 U. CHI. L.
REV. 137, 148 (2013).
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pected immigration violators24 and with respect to various forms of
discretionary relief from deportation.25
At the same time, Congress and the Executive Branch created the
legal structures of the criminal-to-immigration pipeline.26 In 1996,
Congress enacted legislation allowing agreements between the federal
government and local law enforcement agencies that essentially deputize local officials to act as immigration officials.27 These “287(g)
agreements”28 were of two types: jail agreements, whereby jail officials were deputized; and task force agreements, whereby police officers were deputized.29 Although 287(g) agreements rose in
popularity following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, due in
part to the federal government’s “determination . . . to enlist state and
local police in the routine enforcement of federal immigration laws,
criminal and civil alike,”30 at the end of 2012 the federal government
essentially abandoned the task force 287(g) model,31 reportedly based
on the superior efficacy of another criminal-to-immigration pipeline
program, “Secure Communities.”
Secure Communities, launched in March 2008, had as its stated purpose the focusing of deportation resources on immigrants who committed serious crimes.32 The program targets for immigration
enforcement prisoners awaiting trial or serving sentences for local,
24. Das, supra note 23, at 147–48.
25. See, e.g., Vázquez, supra note 21, at 656–57; Fatma E. Marouf, Regrouping America: Immigration Policies and the Reduction of Prejudice, 15 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 129, 146–47 (2012).
26. See, e.g., Vázquez, supra note 21, at 657–60; Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for
Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1763–67 (2013) (detailing programs that “increase Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) access to state and local
defendants”); Angela M. Banks, The Curious Relationship Between “Self-Deportation” Policies
and Naturalization Rates, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1149, 1172–81 (2012) (same).
27. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104208, § 133, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-563 to -564 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012)).
28. The agreements are known as “287(g) agreements” because they are authorized by section
287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g).
29. Banks, supra note 26, at 1174–76.
30. Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1084, 1085 (2004); see also Banks, supra note 26, at 1174 (documenting proliferation of
287(g) agreements mostly during 2007–08).
31. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF: FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 16 (2013),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/mgmt/dhs-budget-in-brief-fy2013.pdf (reducing
the 287(g) budget by $17 million and indicating the federal government would suspend consideration of requests for new 287(g) agreements); see also Michele Waslin, ICE Scaling Back 287(g)
Program, IMMIGR. IMPACT (Oct. 19, 2012), http://www.immigrationimpact.com/2012/10/19/icescaling-back-287g-program/.
32. Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE Unveils Sweeping New
Plan To Target Criminal Aliens in Jails Nationwide: Initiative Aims To Identify and Remove
Criminal Aliens From All U.S. Jails and Prisons (Mar. 28, 2008), available at http://www.ice.gov/
news/releases/0803/080328washington.htm.
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state, or federal crimes. It works by linking federal crime, immigration, and fingerprint databases. Under Secure Communities, when local law enforcement officials submit booking fingerprints to the FBI
for criminal background checks, these fingerprints are then transmitted by the FBI to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
DHS then determines which prisoners to target for immigration enforcement33 and uses immigration “detainers” to gain custody of
them.34
Before 1987, an immigration detainer served merely to notify jail or
prison officials of federal immigration officials’ interest in a prisoner,
and to request that federal immigration officials be notified before
release of the targeted prisoner.35 But in 1987, the Executive Branch
enacted federal regulations that appeared to require agencies receiving an immigration detainer to maintain custody of the targeted prisoner for up to forty-eight hours after his or her release date, to allow
time for immigration officials to arrive and take custody.36 Secure
Communities has increased tenfold the use of immigration detainers
as an enforcement tool,37 and the United States now issues approxi33. David J. Venturella, Secure Communities: Identifying and Removing Criminal Aliens, POCHIEF, Sept. 2010, at 40, 43–44, http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/naylor/CPIM0910/index.php#/40.
34. I have discussed immigration detainers, and some of the legal problems associated with
their use, elsewhere. See generally Christopher N. Lasch, Enforcing the Limits of the Executive’s
Authority To Issue Immigration Detainers, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 164 (2008) [hereinafter
Lasch, Enforcing the Limits]; Christopher N. Lasch, Rendition Resistance, 92 N.C. L. REV. 149
(2013) [hereinafter Lasch, Rendition Resistance]; Christopher N. Lasch, Preempting Immigration
Detainer Enforcement Under Arizona v. United States, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 281 (2013)
[hereinafter Lasch, Preempting Detainers]; Christopher N. Lasch, Federal Immigration Detainers
After Arizona v. United States, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 629 (2013) [hereinafter Lasch, Detainers
After Arizona].
35. See Form I-247 (March 1, 1983) (on file with the author) (“IT IS REQUESTED THAT
YOU: . . . [n]otify this office of the time of release at least 30 days prior to release or as much in
advance of release as possible.”); see also Fernandez-Collado v. INS, 644 F. Supp. 741, 743 n.1
(D. Conn. 1986) (describing immigration detainer as “merely a method of advising the prison
officials to notify the I.N.S. of the petitioner’s release or transfer”).
36. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (2014) (stating that a local law enforcement agency receiving an immigration detainer “shall maintain custody of the alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays in order to permit assumption of custody by the
Department” (emphasis added)). See generally Lasch, Enforcing the Limits, supra note 34, at
182–85 (describing the history of the current regulatory regime). While some courts had held
the use of “shall” in the regulation rendered it mandatory upon state officials, e.g., Rios-Quiroz
v. Williamson Cnty., No. 3-11-1168, 2012 WL 3945354, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 10, 2012), the
Third Circuit rejected this conclusion, holding that “settled constitutional law clearly establishes
that [immigration detainers] must be deemed requests.” Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 643
(3d Cir. 2014).
37. ICE placed 14,803 immigration detainers in fiscal year 2007 and 20,339 in fiscal year 2008.
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF: FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 36 (2008), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budget_bib-fy2008.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
LICE
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mately 250,000 immigration detainers each year.38 Detainers are perhaps the single most important mechanism feeding the criminal-toimmigration pipeline and driving the record numbers of deportations
seen in recent years.39
Crimmigration and its accompanying explosion in the number of
people being funneled from the criminal justice system into the immigration system have troubling racial aspects, which scholars have
noted. Like the criminal justice system,40 the immigration justice system disproportionately impacts people of color.41 Crimmigration’s
BUDGET-IN-BRIEF: FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 35 (2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budget_bib-fy2009.pdf. In fiscal years 2009 and 2010, ICE issued 234,939 and 239,523 detainers respectively, or approximately 20,000 per month. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
BUDGET-IN-BRIEF: FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 63 (2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budget_bib_fy2011.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF: FISCAL YEAR
2012, at 79 (2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budget-bib-fy2012.pdf.
38. The numbers listed above for fiscal years 2009 and 2010, supra note 37, are from ICE’s
Criminal Alien Program. Other ICE programs may make the number of detainers issued even
greater. See Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief and Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus at ¶ 28, Moreno v. Napolitano, No. 11-cv-05452, 2012 WL 5995820 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30,
2012) (alleging 270,988 detainers were issued in fiscal year 2009).
39. See Elise Foley, Deportation Hits Another Record Under Obama Administration, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/21/immigration-deportation_n_2348090.html (discussing Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, FY
2012: ICE Announces Year-End Removal Numbers, Highlights Focus on Key Priorities and Issues New National Detainer Guidance To Further Focus Resources (Dec. 21, 2012), available at
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1212/121221washingtondc2.htm) (noting 409,849 deportations
in FY2012 and 396,906 in FY2011).
40. See generally DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); ROBERT PERKINSON, TEXAS TOUGH: THE
RISE OF AMERICA’S PRISON EMPIRE (2010); MARC MAUER, SENTENCING PROJECT, RACE TO
INCARCERATE (1999).
41. See, e.g., KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL
RIGHTS 13–53 (2004) (describing the historical relationship between immigration enforcement
and racial subordination); Kevin R. Johnson, The Intersection of Race and Class in U.S. Immigration Law and Enforcement, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2009); Kevin R. Johnson, It’s the
Economy, Stupid: The Hijacking of the Debate Over Immigration Reform by Monsters, Ghosts,
and Goblins (or the War on Drugs, War on Terror, Narcoterrorists, etc.), 13 CHAP. L. REV. 583,
608–13 (2010); Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5 (1998) (describing the roots of immigration law’s plenary power doctrine—which permits racial discrimination, in the nineteenth
century race-based laws—and arguing that the “Supreme Court’s immigration jurisprudence
represents the last vestige of an antique period of American law”); Victor C. Romero, Broadening Our World: Citizens and Immigrants of Color in America, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 13, 27–34
(1998); Garcı́a Hernández, supra note 16, at 480–83 (tracing crimmigration’s history to nineteenth century “racist displeasure with Chinese immigrants”); Mary Romero, Racial Profiling
and Immigration Law Enforcement: Rounding Up of Usual Suspects in the Latino Community, 32
CRITICAL SOC. 447, 449 (2006) (analyzing a five-day immigration raid in Chandler, Arizona, to
conclude that “Latinos (particularly dark-complected, poor, and working class) are at risk before
the law”).
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connection of these two systems operates as a “force multiplier”42 of
racial disparity in the areas of both enforcement and detention.
On the enforcement side, for example, the existence of a pipeline
from local criminal justice systems into the federal immigration system
raises fears that the immigration “tail” will wag the criminal enforcement “dog” and lead to ubiquitous racial profiling.43 And on the de42. This sinister term was originally coined by Kris Kobach to advocate in favor of crimmigration. See Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local
Police To Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179 (2006). Kobach argued that state and
local police officers have “inherent authority” to enforce immigration laws, and suggested that
harnessing state and local law enforcement would operate as a “force multiplier” to assist
“[b]eleaguered ICE agents,” id. at 234, that might “mean the difference between success and
failure in enforcing the nation’s immigration laws generally.” Id. at 181. Kobach attempted to
link immigration enforcement and national security, suggesting that had his “force multiplier”
been in place, “several terrorists might have been arrested, and the 9/11 plot might have unraveled.” Id. at 235. Here, I attempt to give the term a more appropriate usage.
43. Critics of the federal government’s detainer practices have raised concern that local police
agencies engage in racial profiling, making arrests “for the sole purpose of having the individual’s immigration status checked” and “on charges they never intend to pursue.” AM. CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION ET AL., COMMENTS ON U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
DRAFT DETAINER POLICY 15 (2010), available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/
files/docs/lac/NGO-DetainerCommentsFinal-10-1-2010.pdf. Studies suggest the fear is not illfounded. Analysis of arrests in Irving, Texas, indicated that when local officials’ access to immigration officials who could place immigration detainers expanded, discretionary arrests of Hispanics for low-level misdemeanors spiked. Trevor Gardener II & Aarti Kohli, The C.A.P. Effect:
Racial Profiling in the ICE Criminal Alien Program 4–6 (Chief Justice Earl Warren Inst. on
Race, Ethnicity & Diversity, U.C. Berkeley Law School, Policy Brief Sept. 2009), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/policybrief_irving_FINAL.pdf (observing correlation between
issuance of detainers and profiling of Latinos in Irving, Texas). After community protests
against racial profiling caused ICE to announce that it would no longer screen individuals arrested for petty offenses, the discretionary arrest rate for Hispanics declined. Id. at 5–6. Similarly, a study of the 287(g) program’s implementation in North Carolina revealed
[a]necdotal evidence and other data suggest[ing] that § 287(g)-deputized law enforcement officers in some North Carolina counties are violating legal standards and engaging in racial profiling by stopping motorists in the community who appear to be
Hispanic/Latino. . . . Concerns mount daily that law enforcement officers equate Hispanic last names and appearances with criminality and use national origin and ethnicity
without probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop and detain residents.
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N.C. LEGAL FOUND. & IMMIGRATION & HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY CLINIC, UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL, THE POLICIES AND POLITICS OF LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT LAWS: 287(g) PROGRAM IN NORTH CAROLINA 44 (2009), available at http://
www.law.unc.edu/documents/clinicalprograms/287gpolicyreview.pdf. Other examples abound.
In Atherton, California, located in San Mateo County, where the sheriff works “hand in hand”
with federal immigration officials and honors all federal immigration detainers, see Bob Egelko,
Sheriffs Divided on Immigration Policy, SFGATE (Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/
article/Sheriffs-divided-on-immigration-policy-4098509.php, an informal study found that 175 of
182 drivers ticketed from February to July 2013 had Hispanic last names. Christina Sterbenz,
Engineer Finds Evidence of Supposed Discrimination in Rich San Francisco Suburb, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 7, 2013, 5:43 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/kent-brewster-analyzes-athertonpolice-blotter-2013-8. And a report examining law enforcement practices in Bedford County,
Tennessee concluded that “[i]mmigrants are targeted at disproportionate rates by officers of
Bedford County law enforcement agencies, particularly the Shelbyville Police Department, as a

968

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:959

tention side, with mass incarceration in the criminal justice system
having been identified by Michelle Alexander as the “New Jim
Crow,”44 crimmigration—which puts detentive force behind “anti-immigration policy both at the state and federal level”—is the obvious
“next frontier in the incarceration of black and brown bodies.”45 It is
no surprise that immigrant detainees are the fastest growing segment
of America’s huge incarcerated population,46 with some 90% of detained immigrants hailing from Mexico, Central America, or the
Caribbean.47
This, then, was the backdrop for the Court’s decision in Padilla v.
Kentucky.
B. Padilla and the Right to Effective Crimmigration Counsel
Jose Padilla, born in Honduras in 1950, came to the United States in
the 1960s as a teenager.48 Aside from a single two-week visit, Padilla
never again returned to Honduras.49 He became a lawful permanent
resident, served the United States in Vietnam, and was honorably discharged from military service.50 He was married twice, with two adult
children from the first marriage and one from the second.51 He made
his home in California with his family—his second wife, three disabled
children, and mother-in-law.52
pretext for making arrests that will enable jailers to contact ICE.” SARAH WHITE & SALMUN
KAZEROUNIAN, TENN. IMMIGRANT & REFUGEE RIGHTS COAL., THE FORGOTTEN CONSTITUTION: RACIAL PROFILING AND IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN BEDFORD COUNTY, TENNESSEE
6 (2011), available at http://www.tnimmigrant.org/storage/The%20Forgotten%20Constitution.
pdf.
44. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 40.
45. Geiza Vargas-Vargas, The Investment Opportunity in Mass Incarceration: A Black (Corrections) or Brown (Immigration) Play?, 48 CAL. W. L. REV. 351, 358 (2012).
46. Robert Koulish, Blackwater and the Privatization of Immigration Control, 20 ST. THOMAS
L. REV. 462, 477 (2008) (noting the “close nexus . . . between immigrant detention policies and
the new boom market in private detention”); see also Vargas-Vargas, supra note 45, at 366–67
(“There is no question that brown bodies are serving as another very real and profound source
for mass incarceration, and such incarceration is legally sanctioned via this notion of immigration
reform.”).
47. DORA SCHIRIRO, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6 (2009), available
at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf.
48. Brief of Petitioner at 8, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (No. 08-651); see also
Padilla v. Commonwealth (Padilla II), 381 S.W.3d 322, 329 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).
49. Padilla II, 381 S.W.3d at 329.
50. Id. at 324; see also Joint Appendix at 72, Padilla, 559 U.S. 356 (No. 08-651), 2009 WL
1499270 (RCr 11.42 motion).
51. Padilla II, 381 S.W.3d at 324.
52. Id.
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Mr. Padilla obtained his commercial driver’s license in Nevada53
and made his living as a self-employed truck driver.54 He owned his
own 18-wheeler, a 1995 Freightliner.55 On September 17, 2001, at a
weigh station off Interstate 65 in Elizabethtown, Kentucky, an inspector noticed that Padilla did not have a proper “weight and distance tax
number” (KYU number) on his truck, and believed Padilla appeared
nervous.56 A consent search of the truck’s cab revealed a “pipe filled
with marijuana and rolling papers,”57 and Padilla was arrested for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. A search of the tractortrailer after Padilla’s arrest revealed over 1,000 pounds of marijuana,58
and Padilla was charged with trafficking in marijuana in addition to
the other charges.59
Padilla pleaded not guilty and was initially released on bond. On
September 19, 2001, however, “after telephonic request of the Motor
Vehicle Enforcement” the judge ordered sua sponte that Padilla’s
bond be revoked and that he be held without bail, “as defendant is
believed to be an illegal alien and is awaiting deportation by the Federal authorities.”60 On September 20, federal immigration officials in
Louisville transmitted to the Hardin County jail a Form I-247 immigration detainer, advising Padilla’s jailers that “[i]nvestigation has
been initiated to determine whether this person is subject to removal
from the United States” and that “Federal regulations (8 CFR 287.7)
require that you detain the alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours
(excluding Saturdays, Sundays and Federal holidays) to provide adequate time for INS to assume custody of the alien.”61
Padilla remained in jail for the next year as he defended his case.62
On August 22, 2002, the day he was scheduled to go to trial, he accepted a plea agreement.63 He pleaded guilty to the felony charge of
trafficking in marijuana and misdemeanor charges of possession of
marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia.64 He was sentenced
on September 17, 2002, in accordance with the plea agreement, to a
53. Joint Appendix, supra note 50, at 79, 84.
54. Padilla II, 381 S.W.3d at 327.
55. Joint Appendix, supra note 50, at 67.
56. Padilla II, 381 S.W.3d at 327; see also Joint Appendix, supra note 50, at 47–48
(indictment).
57. Joint Appendix, supra note 50, at 48 (indictment).
58. Id. at 48–49.
59. Id. at 47–49.
60. Id. at 43 (order); see also Brief of Petitioner, supra note 48, at 8–9.
61. Joint Appendix, supra note 50, at 44–46 (Form I-247 immigration detainer).
62. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 48, at 9.
63. Padilla II, 381 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).
64. Joint Appendix, supra note 50, at 57–60 (Order).
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ten-year sentence, with five years to be served and five years to be
probated.65
In August 2004, Jose Padilla filed a timely postconviction motion to
vacate the criminal judgment,66 alleging his trial lawyer had misadvised him with respect to the immigration consequences of his conviction and thereby rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.67
Specifically, Padilla alleged his attorney told him that he “did not have
to worry about immigration status since he had been in the country so
long.”68 To the contrary, Padilla alleged, the Immigration and Nationality Act specified that a conviction like Mr. Padilla’s would render
him deportable.69 Finally, Padilla alleged that but for counsel’s misadvice, Padilla “would not have plead guilty but would have insisted on
going to trial.”70
The trial court denied Padilla’s motion to vacate the judgment, “on
the basis that a valid guilty plea does not require that the defendant be
informed of every possible consequence of a guilty plea.”71 (The
court also noted that Padilla was on notice of the possibility of deportation because of the change in his bond status, which had been
caused by the suspicion that Padilla was an immigration violator.)72
The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing.73 In so doing, the court of appeals distinguished a
recent decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court holding “collateral
consequences [such as immigration consequences] are outside the
scope of representation required by the Sixth Amendment.” The
court of appeals held that notwithstanding this general rule, such
“gross misadvice” as was alleged by Padilla would justify postconviction relief.74 The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed, adhering to its
categorical rule that “collateral consequences are outside the scope of
65. Id. at 61–68 (Judgment and Order Imposing Sentence).
66. Padilla’s motion was filed pursuant to Kentucky Criminal Rule 11.42. Such a motion must
be filed “within three years after the judgment becomes final,” KY. R. CRIM. P. 11.42(10), and
Padilla’s motion was filed less than two years after his judgment (which he did not appeal).
67. Joint Appendix, supra note 50, at 71–74 (RCr 11.42 Motion).
68. Id. at 72 (RCr 11.42 Motion).
69. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012) and its predecessor statute).
70. Id. at 72–73 (RCr 11.42 Motion).
71. Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008), rev’d and remanded, 559 U.S.
356 (2010).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 483–84 (discussing the Court of Appeals’ distinguishing of Commonwealth v.
Fuartado, 170 S.W.3d 384 (Ky. 2005)).
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the guarantee of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”75 The U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari.76
Padilla thus confronted the Supreme Court with all the hallmarks of
crimmigration—a Latino criminal defendant held in pretrial detention
because of an immigration detainer, which would then funnel him into
an immigration system, having already been branded by his criminal
conviction as deportable and ineligible for any form of discretionary
relief.77 Quite remarkably, the Court grounded its holding in these
very realities of crimmigration law, indicating by the very first paragraph of its analysis it would give them dispositive weight:
The landscape of federal immigration law has changed dramatically
over the last 90 years. While once there was only a narrow class of
deportable offenses and judges wielded broad discretionary authority to prevent deportation, immigration reforms over time have expanded the class of deportable offenses and limited the authority of
judges to alleviate the harsh consequences of deportation. The
“drastic measure” of deportation or removal is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes.78

After recounting the history in some detail, in essence describing the
criminal-to-immigration pipeline described here,79 the Court concluded that “[t]hese changes confirm our view that, as a matter of federal law, deportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most
important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen
defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”80 The Court explained that the “inevitable”81 nature of the pipeline means there is no
meaningful distinction between those consequences occurring on the
criminal end of the pipeline and those occurring on the immigration
end of the pipeline. Because “recent changes in our immigration law
have made removal nearly an automatic result for a broad class of
noncitizen offenders[,] . . . we find it ‘most difficult’ to divorce the
penalty from the conviction in the deportation context.”82 The very
nature of crimmigration, then, led the Court to reject the direct-versus-collateral-consequences analysis and conclude that the Court’s
75. Id. at 485. A number of lower courts had held “collateral consequences” to be beyond the
Sixth Amendment’s reach. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365 n.9 (collecting cases). But some state
courts had recognized counsel’s duty to provide effective crimmigration counsel. See, e.g., People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523 (Colo. 1987); State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799 (N.M. 2004).
76. Padilla v. Kentucky, 555 U.S. 1169 (2009).
77. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 48, at 5–7 (identifying Padilla’s drug trafficking offense
as an “aggravated felony” which rendered him both deportable and ineligible for relief).
78. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360 (citation omitted).
79. Id. at 360–64.
80. Id. at 364 (footnote omitted).
81. Id. at 360.
82. Id. at 366 (quoting United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
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longstanding Sixth Amendment jurisprudence applied with full
force.83
In particular that jurisprudence was the test for ineffective assistance of counsel set forth in the Court’s 1984 decision in Strickland v.
Washington.84 Of the two parts of the Strickland test, the Padilla
Court concerned itself only with the first—“whether counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’”85 The
Court noted this test is one of “prevailing professional norms,” which
are “necessarily linked to the practice and expectations of the legal
community.”86 The Court then drew upon authorities spanning from
1993 to 2009, all requiring defense counsel to advise their clients as to
immigration consequences of a criminal conviction,87 in determining
that counsel is obligated to provide such advice.88 The Court also relied upon these longstanding professional norms to rebuff the suggestion that applying Strickland to cases involving immigration
consequences would loose the floodgates of litigation.
It seems unlikely that our decision today will have a significant effect on those convictions already obtained as the result of plea bargains. For at least the past 15 years, professional norms have
generally imposed an obligation on counsel to provide advice on the
deportation consequences of a client’s plea. We should, therefore,
presume that counsel satisfied their obligation to render competent
advice at the time their clients considered pleading guilty.89

Finding the deficient performance prong of the Strickland test easily
met, the Court left application of the second prong of the Strickland

83. Id. (“We conclude that advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the
ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Strickland applies to Padilla’s claim.”).
84. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
85. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).
86. Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).
87. Id. at 366–69.
88. As César Cuauhtémoc Garcı́a Hernández has pointed out, “[a]ll, however, is not perfect”
with the Padilla application of Strickland in the context of providing crimmigration advice. César Cuauhtémoc Garcı́a Hernández, Strickland-Lite: Padilla’s Two-Tiered Duty for Noncitizens,
72 MD. L. REV. 844, 849 (2013). The Padilla Court adopted a two-tiered duty for defense counsel. In cases where the immigration consequences of a conviction are “truly clear,” defense
counsel must convey those consequences. Id. at 851 (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369). But if
“the law is not succinct and straightforward,” counsel need only advise her client that a conviction “may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.” Id. (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at
381). This “ ‘Strickland-lite’ duty to investigate immigration consequences allows an attorney to
cease investigation for reasons completely unrelated to a calculation that further investigation
would yield the defendant no additional benefit. . . . Nowhere else in the duty-to-investigate
case law can one find such an end point.” Id. at 851–52.
89. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372 (citations omitted) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
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test—prejudice flowing from counsel’s deficient performance—for the
Kentucky courts on remand.90
It is worth briefly recounting the next chapter in Jose Padilla’s story
because it well illuminates some of the realities of the plea bargaining
process and the concomitant challenges in effectuating Padilla’s right
to effective crimmigration counsel.91 The evidentiary hearing conducted by the Kentucky trial court revealed that Padilla’s attorney believed that Padilla was “an illegal alien,” and had no idea Padilla was a
lawful permanent resident. As Padilla’s counsel before the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out, Padilla’s trial counsel did nothing to disabuse the trial court of its misimpression that Padilla was “believed to
be an illegal alien,” upon which the trial court rested its order revoking bail and holding Padilla without bond.92 Counsel’s failure even to
understand his client’s immigration status may have resulted in his
pretrial detention and contributed to Padilla’s willingness to plea bargain.93 This is particularly likely given that Mr. Padilla testified he
believed he would be released on parole as a result of the plea
bargain.94
Padilla’s attorney believed—also incorrectly—“that because Padilla
was a veteran who had lived in the United States for over forty years,
he would not be deported.”95 He conveyed this to Padilla and to Padilla’s wife, Ingrid.96 On the day of Padilla’s scheduled trial, his counsel urged Ingrid to persuade Padilla to accept the plea offer.97 She did
so, believing that he would not be deported and that he would be
eligible for parole.98 Padilla’s daughter Yoshii also contributed to Padilla accepting the plea. Although he had previously maintained his
90. Id. at 369.
91. See generally Yolanda Vázquez, Realizing Padilla’s Promise: Ensuring Noncitizen Defendants Are Advised of the Immigration Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 39 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 169 (2011).
92. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 48, at 8–9.
93. See Oren Gazal-Ayal & Avishalom Tor, The Innocence Effect, 62 DUKE L.J. 339, 400
(2012) (noting that studies have linked time defendants spend in pretrial detention to increased
willingness to plea bargain); see also Russell Covey, Reconsidering the Relationship Between
Cognitive Psychology and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 213, 240 (2007) (“A large proportion of defendants thus make the decision to plead guilty not while they remain ‘on the street’
but from behind bars, minimizing the perception of a guilty plea as a loss from the status quo
baseline.”).
94. Padilla II, 381 S.W.3d 322, 330 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012); see also Covey, supra note 93, at 240
(“Where the expected sentence following a guilty plea is time served, and the cost of holding out
for a trial is continued detention, the perception that a guilty plea is a gain and trial a loss is
virtually overwhelming.”).
95. Padilla II, 381 S.W.3d at 327.
96. Id. at 327–28.
97. Id. at 328.
98. Id.
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innocence99 and rejected a similar offer, Padilla accepted the plea offer on the day of trial because both Ingrid and Yoshii were “distraught
over his potential prison sentence.”100 Padilla testified that had he
known that his plea would render him deportable, “he would have
insisted on a trial because deportation was the same as ‘putting a gun’
to his head.”101
The Kentucky trial court denied Padilla’s postconviction motion,
holding it would have been irrational for Padilla to proceed to trial
given the evidence against him: “A rational defendant would not have
risked a sentence of ten years by insisting on going to trial in this
case.”102 Fortunately, the Padilla Court, cognizant of the criminal-toimmigration pipeline, had squarely confronted the fact that given the
realities of crimmigration, the immigration consequences of a particular case might be of far greater importance to a defendant like Jose
Padilla than the criminal consequences.103 The Kentucky Court of
Appeals, however, heeded Padilla’s teaching that “the noncitizen defendant’s right to remain in the United States ‘may be more important
to the [defendant] than any jail sentence.’”104 The court found that
under the circumstances, Padilla’s decision was eminently rational:
99. Id. The trial court held that Padilla could not establish prejudice from his lawyer’s misadvice concerning the immigration consequences attendant to a plea, because the evidence of guilt
would have made going to trial an irrational choice for Padilla. Id. The Kentucky Court of
Appeals, however, found that based on all of the evidence, including Padilla’s own testimony
that he “had no right to inspect the contents of the load he transported and was unaware that he
was transporting marijuana,” a “reasonable jury could find that Padilla was unaware that the
load he transported contained marijuana.” Id. at 330.
100. Id. at 327.
101. Padilla II, 381 S.W.3d at 327.
102. Id. at 328.
103. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368 (2010) (“ ‘[P]reserving the client’s right to remain
in the United States may be more important to the client than any potential jail sentence.’ Likewise, we have recognized that ‘preserving the possibility of’ discretionary relief from deportation
. . . ‘would have been one of the principal benefits sought by defendants deciding whether to
accept a plea offer or instead to proceed to trial.’ ” (citation omitted) (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533
U.S. 289, 322–23 (2001))).
104. Padilla II, 381 S.W.3d at 329 (alteration in original) (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368).
By eviscerating the direct-versus-collateral consequences distinction, and requiring counsel to
attend to the immigration consequences based on their importance to the defendant, the Court
gave constitutional backing to the practice of client-centered, holistic lawyering. See Robin
Steinberg, Heeding Gideon’s Call in the Twenty-First Century: Holistic Defense and the New
Public Defense Paradigm, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 961, 974 (2013) (“Padilla clarifies what
holistic defense was created to address—that criminal case dispositions have dire consequences
and effects in many areas of a client’s life that must be addressed.”); see also McGregor Smyth,
“Collateral” No More: The Practical Imperative for Holistic Defense in a Post-Padilla World . . .
or, How To Achieve Consistently Better Results for Clients, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 139,
144 (2011).
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“[F]or Padilla, exile is a far worst [sic] prospect than the maximum ten
year sentence.”105
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S FAILURE TO ENFORCE THE RIGHT
EFFECTIVE CRIMMIGRATION COUNSEL

TO

Padilla announced that the Strickland test would govern claims of
ineffective assistance relating to crimmigration advice. The next challenge for the Court would be in enforcing the Padilla rule. The
Chaidez case presented the Court with the opportunity to define the
circumstances under which a Strickland violation regarding crimmigration advice could be remedied.
The question presented in Roselva Chaidez’s petition for certiorari
was “whether Padilla applies to persons whose convictions became
final before its announcement.”106 Some background on the Court’s
“retroactivity”107 jurisprudence is necessary to understand the decision the Court faced in Chaidez.
A. The Griffith/Teague Retroactivity Rules and Their
Underlying Policies
The U.S. Supreme Court’s rules for deciding “retroactivity” questions are embodied in two seminal decisions. In its 1987 decision in
Griffith v. Kentucky,108 the Court established a rule of full retroactivity in proceedings on direct review. And in Teague v. Lane,109 it established a rule of nonretroactivity (with two narrow exceptions, for
rules placing conduct “beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe” and “watershed” rules implicating a trial’s fundamental fairness) in federal habeas corpus proceedings to review a
state court criminal conviction.
The policy considerations underlying these rules took shape over
four decades from the late 1940s to the late 1980s when Griffith and
Teague were decided.110 Understanding the policies animating the
105. Padilla II, 381 S.W.3d at 330.
106. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013) (No.
11-820).
107. Before Danforth v. Minnesota, questions such as that presented in Chaidez were referred
to as “retroactivity” questions. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271 n.5 (2008). As
discussed below, see infra notes 142–163 and accompanying text, Danforth suggested a shift in
terminology. Here I will use “retroactivity” in discussing cases before Danforth, to be consistent
with historical usage.
108. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
109. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (plurality opinion).
110. I traced this history in an earlier article. Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of Teague
Retroactivity, or “Redressability,” After Danforth v. Minnesota: Why Lower Courts Should Give
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Griffith/Teague rules is important here for several reasons. First, a
critical analysis of Chaidez111 depends on understanding the reasons
underlying the rules the Court applied there. Second, an understanding of those reasons is essential to a discussion of what state postconviction courts ought to do when confronted with questions of Padilla’s
retroactivity.112
The roots of Griffith and Teague lie in the expansion of federal
habeas corpus review of state criminal judgments.113 This expansion
caused the Court in 1965 to announce, in Linkletter v. Walker,114 a
three-factor balancing test for determining the retroactivity in federal
habeas proceedings for violation of a new constitutional rule. The
Linkletter test was soon applied beyond federal habeas cases, though,
“produc[ing] strikingly divergent results” and drawing scathing criticism.115 In two influential opinions (his dissent in Desist v. United
States116 and his separate opinion in Mackey v. United States117), Justice Harlan outlined a framework that would later be adopted nearly
wholesale in Griffith and Teague.
Griffith’s rule of retroactivity for cases on direct review was
grounded in Justice Harlan’s conclusion that “failure to apply a newly
declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review
violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication.”118 First, the
Court noted, “the nature of judicial review requires that we adjudicate
specific cases, and each case usually becomes the vehicle for announcement of a new rule.”119 In particular, Justice Harlan had
feared that allowing new rules to justify redress only prospectively
would eliminate the obligation of lower courts to decide claims and
eviscerate their “responsibility for developing or interpreting the Constitution.”120 This, Justice Harlan believed, would effectively freeze
constitutional doctrine and render the lower courts “automatons.”121
Retroactive Effect to New Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure in Postconviction Proceedings, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 8–27 (2009); see also id. at 8 n.17 (referencing other scholarly
works tracing the development of the Griffith/Teague rules).
111. See infra Part III.C.
112. See infra Part IV.
113. Lasch, supra note 110, at 32; see also Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 272–73 (2008).
114. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965).
115. Danforth, 552 U.S. at 273.
116. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 257 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
117. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in part).
118. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987).
119. Id.
120. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 680 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in
part).
121. Id.
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Second, and equally importantly, a system of less than full redressability would produce intolerable inequalities. To give redress to one
litigant and deny it to others on direct review would be treating “similarly situated defendants” differently without a principled reason for
doing so.122
Teague’s rule of nonretroactivity for cases on federal habeas corpus
review, on the other hand, was grounded in Justice Harlan’s concerns
for comity and respect for the finality of state court judgments.123
“Federalism and comity considerations,” of course, “are unique to
federal habeas review of state convictions.”124 Those concerns were
not at stake in Chaidez, which concerned federal review of a federal
conviction, and are not at stake in state postconviction proceedings,
which concern state review of a state conviction. The finality concern
underlying the Teague antiretroactivity rule, on the other hand, is implicated in both contexts.125 Finality arrived in the Teague opinion as
a relevant consideration by way of Justice Harlan’s opinion in Mackey.
“Finality in the criminal law is an end which must always be kept in
plain view,” Justice Harlan had written, citing influential law review
articles by Harvard law professor Paul Bator and by Second Circuit
Judge Henry Friendly.126 The Teague opinion referenced Justice
Harlan’s Mackey opinion as well as the Bator and Friendly articles.127
While Teague’s reliance on finality as a justification for nonredressability finds its roots in the articles of Professor Bator and Judge
Friendly, it is important to note that neither author unqualifiedly embraced finality. Indeed, both recognized the existence of, in Professor
Bator’s words, “general categories where . . . the first go-around . . .
should not count, and where relitigation serves obvious and appropriate ends.”128 For Professor Bator, collateral review was generally justified where the initial review failed to provide an opportunity to
122. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323 (citing Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258–59 (1969)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
123. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 279 (2008).
124. Id.
125. See id. at 280 (noting that finality is “implicated in the context of state as well as federal
habeas . . . [and] is a matter that States should be free to evaluate, and weigh the importance of,
when prisoners held in state custody are seeking a remedy for a violation of federal rights by
their lower courts”).
126. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 690 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in
part) (citing Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963); Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack
on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 146–51 (1970)).
127. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989) (plurality opinion) (citing Mackey, 401 U.S. at
691 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in part)).
128. Bator, supra note 126, at 454.
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litigate essential claims.129 He provided as an example a defendant’s
claim that “the failure of the state to provide counsel deprived him of
a fair chance to make his defense.”130 For Professor Bator, it was a
matter of due process that a state should provide a forum for such
claims to be litigated.131 Judge Friendly similarly excepted from finality’s ambit the raising on collateral attack of constitutional claims, the
factual bases of which “are dehors the record and their effect on the
judgment was not subject to consideration and review on appeal.”132
Like Professor Bator, Judge Friendly suggested a state’s failure to permit postconviction review of such claims might amount to a due process violation.133
The Teague Court recognized that even the interests in comity and
finality that are present when a federal habeas court reviews a state
court judgment must yield in the face of a sufficiently important new
constitutional rule. Into this category, Teague put: (1) rules that place
conduct “beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to
proscribe”; and (2) “watershed” rules of constitutional criminal procedure.134 Both exceptions were drawn from Justice Harlan’s opinions
in Desist and Mackey.
The “substantive due process” exception to the Teague rule—for
rules placing conduct “beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe”—was taken directly from Justice Harlan’s
opinion in Mackey.135 Justice Harlan’s view was that a substantive
due process rule “forbid[ding] the Government to utilize certain techniques or processes in enforcing concededly valid societal proscriptions on individual behavior” represented “the clearest instance where
finality interests should yield,” given “the obvious interest in freeing
individuals from punishment for conduct that is constitutionally
protected.”136
The watershed exception to the Teague rule combined aspects of
Justice Harlan’s Mackey and Desist opinions. The watershed exception has two requirements—a new rule must not only be “implicit in
129. Id. at 455–60.
130. Id. at 458.
131. Id. at 459–60.
132. Friendly, supra note 126, at 152 (quoting Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104–05 (1942)).
133. Id. at 168.
134. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307–15 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey v.
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and
dissenting in part)).
135. Id. at 307 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in
part and dissenting in part)).
136. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692–93 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in part).
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the concept of ordered liberty,” but it must also be a rule that promotes the accuracy of the fact-finding process.137 Justice Harlan endorsed the first watershed requirement—that a new constitutional
rule be “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”—but not the accuracy requirement. Although he had earlier favored an accuracy requirement,138 Justice Harlan explicitly rejected it in Mackey, in part
because he found “inherently intractable the purported distinction between those new rules that are designed to improve the factfinding
process and those designed principally to further other values.”139
Teague thus based its watershed exception on Justice Harlan’s writings, but imported the accuracy requirement despite the expressed
views of Justice Harlan’s more recent opinion in Mackey.
Taken together, Griffith and Teague reveal four distinct rules reflecting the competing policies at work in the Court’s crafting of its
retroactivity jurisprudence:
(1) The Griffith retroactivity rule. Here, the Court considered
claims being litigated in the first round of review, and the
Court’s dominant concerns were with providing litigants equal
access to a forum for constitutional claims and an opportunity
for courts to develop constitutional doctrine.
(2) The Teague antiretroactivity rule. Addressing the rules for federal habeas review of state court judgments, in which claims are
typically being relitigated in a federal forum after having been
litigated once in state court, the Court’s dominant concerns
were comity and finality.
(3) The Teague substantive due process retroactivity rule. Where a
new constitutional rule limits the scope of the criminal law, “the
obvious interest in freeing individuals from punishment for conduct that is constitutionally protected”140 overcomes any interests in finality or comity presented by federal review of state
court judgments.
(4) The Teague watershed retroactivity rule. Where a new constitutional rule is both “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”
137. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311–12 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan,
J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in part)).
138. The Teague Court relied on Justice Harlan’s Desist opinion in adding the accuracy requirement. Id. at 312 (citing Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). The accuracy requirement endorsed by Justice Harlan in his Desist opinion, however,
was a concern with procedural accuracy, not factual accuracy. See Lasch, supra note 110, at
28–29. At any rate, Justice Harlan in Mackey rejected any concern with accuracy.
139. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 695 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in
part); see also Bator, supra note 126, at 449 (urging a focus “not so much [on] the substantive
question whether truth prevailed” but on whether fair process had been afforded for determining the facts).
140. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in
part).
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and promotes the accuracy of the fact-finding process,141 the
need to apply such a watershed rule overcomes any interests in
finality or comity presented by federal review of state court
judgments.

B. One Step Forward: Danforth and the Embrace of
“Redressability” (Not “Retroactivity”)
The Court had occasion to elucidate the scope of the Teague rule in
2007, when it granted certiorari in Danforth v. Minnesota,142 to decide
whether state courts are required to adhere to Teague when determining whether U.S. Supreme Court decisions apply retroactively in state
court proceedings.143 Danforth arose from a state postconviction petition in which the petitioner claimed the use of a videotaped interview
of a child witness at his 1996 trial violated the constitutional rule announced in the Court’s 2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington.144
The Minnesota courts held themselves bound to apply the Teague antiretroactivity rule, and further held that Teague barred application of
the Crawford rule in petitioner’s postconviction proceedings.145 The
Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Danforth’s argument that Teague
only limits the scope of federal habeas review “and does not limit
the retroactive application of new rules in state postconviction
proceedings.”146
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that in state postconviction
proceedings, Teague does not “explicitly or implicitly constrain[] the
authority of the States to provide remedies for a broader range of
constitutional violations than are redressable on federal habeas.”147
There are several aspects of Danforth that are important both for understanding the Chaidez decision and for considering what factors
should guide state postconviction courts faced with determining
whether to apply Padilla to convictions predating the decision.
At the outset of its analysis, the Danforth Court explained that it
“may . . . make more sense to speak in terms of the ‘redressability’ of
violations of new rules, rather than the ‘retroactivity’ of such rules.”148
141. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311–12 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan,
J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in part)).
142. Danforth v. Minnesota, 550 U.S. 956 (2007).
143. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4–5, Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008) (No.
06-8273).
144. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
145. Danforth, 552 U.S. at 267–68.
146. Id. at 268 n.2 (quoting Danforth v. State, 718 N.W.2d 451, 456 (Minn. 2006)).
147. Id. at 275. A more thorough analysis of Danforth is available in my earlier article. See
Lasch, supra note 110, at 33–42.
148. Danforth, 552 U.S. at 271 n.5.
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The use of “retroactivity” terminology, the Court said, falsely “suggests that when we declare that a new constitutional rule of criminal
procedure is ‘nonretroactive,’ we are implying that the right at issue
was not in existence prior to the date the ‘new rule’ was announced.”149 New constitutional rules, the Court explained, are discovered—not created. The question of whether a new rule is
retroactive is more properly considered as whether a particular defendant who suffered a violation of the new rule prior to its announcement is entitled to redress for the violation.150
The Court thus emphasized that Teague’s antiretroactivity rule is
not a constitutional rule. Teague does not define the contours of the
Court’s newly announced constitutional rights;151 rather, “Teague’s
general rule of nonretroactivity was an exercise of [the] Court’s power
to interpret the federal habeas statute.”152 This interpretation was
grounded in “equitable and prudential considerations” concerning the
scope of federal habeas relief.153 Those considerations, of course, included “comity and respect for the finality of state convictions.” Comity, the Court noted, is a concern “unique to federal habeas review of
state convictions.”154 As for finality, the Court concluded: “[F]inality
of state convictions is a state interest, not a federal one. It is a matter
that States should be free to evaluate, and weigh the importance of,
when prisoners held in state custody are seeking a remedy for a violation of federal rights by their lower courts.”155
Danforth instructs the state courts to craft their own redressability
rules, based on their own assessment of the equitable and prudential
considerations pertinent to the state. It is worth pondering whether
the three pro-retroactivity rules in the Griffith/Teague coterie of retroactivity rules156 are also non-constitutional rules that the states may
disregard as they fashion their own redressability rules. The Griffith
retroactivity rule, by its terms, requires state courts as well as federal
courts to apply new constitutional rules to cases not yet final on direct
149. Id. at 271.
150. Id.
151. Id. (clarifying that “the ‘retroactivity’ of a new rule is not the temporal scope of a newly
announced right”); see also id. at 275 (holding that “Linkletter and then Teague considered what
constitutional violations may be remedied on federal habeas. They did not define the scope of
the ‘new’ constitutional rights themselves.” (footnote omitted)).
152. Id. at 278.
153. Id.
154. Danforth, 552 U.S. at 279.
155. Id. at 280.
156. See supra notes 108–141 and accompanying text.
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review.157 And although the Teague opinion did not specifically identify the substantive due process retroactivity rule as binding on state
courts, the Court’s later opinion in Penry v. Lynaugh158 suggests this
rule is constitutionally based and binding on the state courts.159 Finally, whether the watershed retroactivity rule—which has never encountered a constitutional rule that meets its requirements—is
binding on the states was a question explicitly left open in Danforth.160
Even if these rules requiring redress are not binding on the states, the
fact that the Court has held certain circumstances sufficient to overcome the comity and finality concerns presented when a new federal
constitutional rule is applied to a state criminal judgment suggests a
state court would be hard pressed to justify denying redress in circumstances where comity and finality are lessened.161 Thus, the justifica157. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1986) (“We therefore hold that a new rule for the
conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final . . . .”). Whether the Griffith rule is constitutionally based
has been questioned. See, e.g., Russell M. Coombs, A Third Parallel Primrose Path: The Supreme Court’s Repeated, Unexplained, and Still Growing Regulation of State Courts’ Criminal
Appeals, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 541, 607–08 (criticizing the Court’s “transparently inadequate
explanations” for “its supposed constitutional power to govern state criminal appeals”); Jill E.
Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1076
n.129 (1997) (suggesting that the Court’s “[s]ubsequent opinions . . . cast doubt upon the extent
to which the result in Griffith was grounded in the Constitution”). But see TGX Corp. v. Simmons, 786 F. Supp. 587, 593 (E.D. La. 1992) (stating that “Griffith rested squarely on constitutional grounds”).
158. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002).
159. In Penry, the Court noted that Justice Harlan had rooted his substantive due process
exception to nonretroactivity in “categorical guarantees accorded by the Constitution,” and
noted that where “the Constitution itself deprives the State of the power to impose a certain
penalty, . . . the finality and comity concerns underlying Justice Harlan’s view of retroactivity
have little force.” Id. at 329–30. See In re Holladay, 331 F.3d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that “there is no question that the new constitutional rule abstractly described in Penry and
formally articulated in Atkins is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review”).
160. Danforth, 552 U.S. at 269 n.4. The fact that Congress, and many states, have carved out
explicit exceptions to other finality-serving doctrines to accommodate watershed rules, suggests
that even if redress might constitutionally be withheld for violations of such rules, it is not likely
to be. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) (2012) (tolling the statute of limitations for a federal
habeas petition for a claim based on a constitutional right “newly recognized by the Supreme
Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review”); id. § 2244(b)(2)(A)
(permitting a successor habeas petition based on a newly recognized constitutional right made
retroactive); KY. R. CRIM. P. 11.42(10)(b) (tolling the statute of limitations for a state postconviction action if based on a newly recognized right made retroactive); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30122 (2012) (permitting retroactive application, in state postconviction proceedings, of a “new
rule of constitutional criminal law . . . [that either] places primary, private individual conduct
beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe or requires the observance
of fairness safeguards that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”).
161. See Lasch, supra note 110, at 40–42.
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tions for each of the Court’s three pro-retroactivity rules are
instructive for state courts addressing redressability.
A final question left open in Danforth was whether the Court’s reasoning freeing the states from the strictures of Teague would apply
with equal force to federal postconviction proceedings.162 Although
the question was left open, the Danforth majority suggested that
“[m]uch of the reasoning applicable to applications for writs of habeas
corpus filed pursuant to § 2254 seems equally applicable in the context
of [28 U.S.C.] § 2255 motions.”163 Arguably, though, in assessing
redressability, federal postconviction actions are in all relevant respects analogous to state postconviction proceedings.164 As with state
postconviction proceedings, there are no comity considerations when
a federal court reviews a federal criminal conviction. Likewise, the
finality considerations presented in federal postconviction proceedings are analogous to those presented in state postconviction proceedings—in both cases a criminal judgment is reopened at the conclusion
of the direct review track.
Indeed it was a claim arising in federal postconviction proceedings
that presented the Court with the opportunity to decide the retroactivity of Padilla v. Kentucky and the Court’s decision applying Strickland to claims of ineffective crimmigration counsel.
C. Two Steps Backward: Chaidez and the Retreat to Retroactivity
Like Jose Padilla, Roselva Chaidez had been a lawful permanent
resident for decades before she was charged with the crime that would
make her deportable. Born in Mexico in the 1950s,165 Ms. Chaidez
migrated to the United States in the 1970s and became a lawful permanent resident in 1977.166 She lives in Chicago with her three children and two grandchildren, all of whom are United States citizens.167
Ms. Chaidez is responsible for caring for her grandchildren while her
daughter works.168 Ms. Chaidez’s only relatives in Mexico are halfbrothers and half-sisters with whom she has had no contact since the
mid-1990s.169
162. Danforth, 552 U.S. at 269 n.4.
163. Id. at 281 n.16.
164. Lasch, supra note 110, at 65–67.
165. See Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis at 6, United States v. Chaidez, No. 1:09-cv06372 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 11, 2009) (listing Ms. Chaidez’s age as 53).
166. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013) (No. 11-820).
167. Id.
168. United States v. Chaidez, No. 03 CR 636-6, 2010 WL 3979664, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6,
2010).
169. Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis, supra note 165, at 6.

984

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:959

In 2003, Ms. Chaidez was charged in federal district court with three
counts of mail fraud. She had been persuaded by others to participate
in an insurance fraud scheme,170 whereby she falsely claimed to have
been a passenger involved in a car accident. Ms. Chaidez received
$1,200 for her part in the scheme, but because the total amount paid
by the insurance company was $26,000, the charges she faced qualified
as aggravated felonies.171 (In 1996, Congress had reduced the loss
threshold for acts of fraud to qualify as an aggravated felony from
$200,000 to $10,000.)172
On December 3, 2003, Ms. Chaidez entered a “blind” plea to two
counts of the indictment.173 She was sentenced to four years’ probation and ordered to pay restitution.174 Ms. Chaidez faithfully and successfully attended to the obligations of her probated sentence.175
In July 2007, Ms. Chaidez applied for U.S. citizenship.176 Ms.
Chaidez, who does not speak English, received assistance from nonattorneys in filling out her application.177 The application stated she
had never been convicted of a crime.178 On October 15, 2008, Ms.
Chaidez was interviewed by immigration authorities, who asked her
about the 2003 fraud conviction.179 Ms. Chaidez admitted she had
been convicted.180 Immigration officials told Ms. Chaidez they
needed to conduct further investigation, and she would be
contacted.181
In March 2009, Ms. Chaidez received a Notice to Appear, indicating
the United States sought to deport her based on her mail fraud convictions.182 In October 2009, Ms. Chaidez, with the assistance of counsel, petitioned for a writ of coram nobis in the federal district court
where she had been convicted.183 Her petition alleged that neither the
170. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 166, at 2. The United States acknowledged
Chaidez’s plea hearing that she was “not aware of the specifics of the scheme.” Id.
171. Id. at 2–3.
172. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 106, at 4–5 (citing 8
§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) (2012); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 321, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-627 to -628).
173. Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis, supra note 165, at 2.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. United States v. Chaidez, No. 03 CR 636-6, 2010 WL 3979664, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
2010).
177. Id. at *1–2.
178. Id. at *1.
179. Id.
180. Id. at *2.
181. Id. at *1.
182. Chaidez, 2010 WL 3979664, at *1.
183. Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis, supra note 165.

at Ms.

U.S.C.
Act of

Oct. 6,
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court nor her court-appointed counsel had advised her of the immigration consequences attendant to her guilty plea.184 Given that Ms.
Chaidez had completed the terms of her probation and was no longer
“in custody” relating to her conviction, coram nobis rather than
habeas corpus was the appropriate procedural vehicle for Ms. Chaidez
to bring her postconviction challenge to her plea.185
The district court dismissed Ms. Chaidez’s first petition because it
was improperly filed as a new civil action, and directed that the petition be filed in her criminal case.186 Shortly after Ms. Chaidez filed
her corrected petition, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Padilla.187
The government quickly asserted Padilla could not be applied retroactively in Ms. Chaidez’s case.188
The district court required Ms. Chaidez to supplement her petition
with an affidavit,189 dispensing with the government’s retroactivity argument by holding that Padilla merely applied Strickland, and noting
the Court’s statement in Padilla that “[f]or at least the past 15 years,
professional norms have generally imposed an obligation on counsel
to provide advice on the deportation consequences of a client’s
plea.”190 After Ms. Chaidez submitted her affidavit, the district court
issued a more thorough opinion on Padilla’s retroactivity. The court
once again found Padilla to be fully applicable in Ms. Chaidez’s case.
The court noted that Padilla itself arose from the postconviction
track—yet the Supreme Court failed to raise the Teague rule sua
sponte, though it could have (and indeed had done so in Teague itself).191 “[I]f Chaidez’s claim is barred by Teague, Padilla’s claim
should have been barred as well,” wrote the court.192 The court found
affirmative support for the notion that the Padilla Court intended its
decision to be retroactive in the Court’s concern with the floodgates
argument raised by the government: “If the Court intended Padilla to
184. Id. at 2.
185. United States v. Chaidez, No. 03 CR 636-6, 2010 WL 2740282, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 8,
2010) (order requiring petitioner to submit affidavit).
186. United States v. Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d 896, 898 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
187. Id.
188. Government’s Supplemental Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Writ of
Error Coram Nobis at 1–2, United States v. Chaidez, No. 03 CR 636-6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 2010).
189. Chaidez, 2010 WL 2740282, at *3. The district court’s order also noted that Ms.
Chaidez’s affidavit should address the timeliness of her filing. Id. at *2. The government had
earlier raised laches as a defense to Ms. Chaidez’s petition. Government’s Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Writ of Error Coram Nobis at 5, United States v. Chaidez, No. 03
CR 636-6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2010).
190. Chaidez, 2010 WL 2740282, at *2 (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010)).
191. Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 902–03.
192. Id. at 903.
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be a new rule which would apply only prospectively, the entire ‘floodgates’ discussion would have been unnecessary.”193
The district court also noted that giving Padilla retroactive effect in
Ms. Chaidez’s case was completely consistent with the policies underlying Teague. First, the court found the Strickland standard by its nature accommodates the finality interest served by Teague, because
“[a] post-conviction court applying Strickland is bound to consider
whether counsel’s assistance was effective with reference to professional standards as they existed at the time of the conviction.”194 Second, because Strickland ineffectiveness claims are typically brought in
postconviction proceedings because of the need for factual development not available on appeal, “the court hearing the Strickland claim
in a collateral attack on a federal conviction will serve a function similar to the appellate court.”195 As such, postconviction proceedings
provide the only forum for constitutional development of claims relating to ineffectiveness: “If the Supreme Court had refused on retroactivity grounds to reach the constitutional claim in Padilla, no court
would ever have been able to establish that counsel must advise about
immigration consequences of a guilty plea.”196
Having once again determined that the Padilla rule would apply to
Ms. Chaidez’s petition, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing.
Ms. Chaidez testified that her court-appointed attorney never told
Chaidez her guilty plea made her deportable, and that she only became aware of these consequences when she received the Notice to
Appear in March 2009.197 Ms. Chaidez testified “that her family and
her life are in the United States,” that she “would have done everything possible to remain in the United States,” and that she would
have gone to trial had she known of the immigration consequences.198
The district court credited Ms. Chaidez’s testimony, found that she
had timely presented her claims (rejecting the government’s laches defense), and granted her petition to vacate her conviction.199
The Seventh Circuit reversed.200 Whereas the district court had engaged in a functional assessment of whether application of Teague to
193. Id. (quoting United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL 2650625, at * 7 (E.D.
Cal. July 1, 2010)).
194. Id. This argument is amplified below. See infra Part IV.A.4.
195. Id. at 904. This argument is amplified below. See infra Part IV.A.3.
196. Id. This argument is amplified below. See infra Part IV.A.5.
197. United States v. Chaidez, No. 03 CR 636-6, 2010 WL 3979664, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6,
2010).
198. Id.
199. Id. at *2–4.
200. Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011).
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Chaidez’s claim made sense, the Seventh Circuit undertook a mechanical application of Teague. The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by
identifying a “new” rule as one not “dictated by precedent.”201 Without irony, and without any acknowledgment of the district court’s assessment of the finality interests at stake in this federal postconviction
case, the court noted that Teague was fashioned to respond to the
unique interests at stake in federal habeas review of state court criminal judgments.202 Given the test (“dictated by precedent”), the result
was foreordained. To reach it, the Seventh Circuit relied heavily on
disuniformity on the Court itself (two Justices concurring and two dissenting in Padilla, confirming that the decision was not “dictated by
precedent”)203 and the relative pre-Padilla unanimity among the
lower courts that immigration consequences were “collateral” and
therefore not within the scope of counsel’s duties.204
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in April 2012.205
It is important to understand just what was at stake in Chaidez. Ms.
Chaidez’s case, in which she first learned of the immigration consequences of her guilty plea nearly six years later, was exemplary of a
commonplace occurrence given the realities of crimmigration. It is an
essential component of the crimmigration system that any criminal
conviction can be an entry point to the criminal-to-immigration pipeline at any time. The conviction can be ancient.206 It can be completely served, as Ms. Chaidez’s conviction was.207 It can even be
201. Id. at 688 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (plurality
opinion)).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 689–90, 694.
204. Id. at 690–92.
205. Chaidez v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2101 (2012).
206. See Brief of the American Immigration Lawyers Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 12, 16, 18–20, Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013) (No. 11-820)
(detailing a case of an 81-year-old man deported for a crime committed twenty years earlier, a
case of a 62-year-old who died in immigration detention in 2008 while in deportation proceedings based on convictions from 1979, and the case of Juan Lopez, who sought postconviction
relief from a 25-year-old conviction); see also, e.g., Christie v. Elwood, Civil No. 11-7070 (FLW),
2012 WL 266454, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2012) (detailing ICE’s arrest of Harold Christie in 2012
and initiation of deportation proceedings based on convictions occurring between 1985 and
1996).
207. See Brief of the American Immigration Lawyers Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 206, at 14–16 (detailing case of Emanuel Sumanariu, who was put
into deportation proceedings long after completing probation and paying restitution); see also,
e.g., Castaneda v. Souza, Civil Action No. 13-10874-WGY, 2013 WL 3353747 (D. Mass. July 3,
2013) (detailing the case of Leiticia Castaneda, who was put into deportation proceedings in
2013 after completing her probation in 2010); Baquera v. Longshore, No. 13-cv-00543-RMMEH, 2013 WL 2423178, at *2–3 (D. Colo. June 4, 2013) (detailing the case of Erick Rogelio
Nieto Baquera, who was put into deportation proceedings in 2013 after completing his probation
in 2007); Santos-Sanchez v. Elwood, Civil Action No. 12-6639 (FLW), 2013 WL 1165010 (D.N.J.
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dismissed after diversion or expunged.208 What is unique about crimmigration, making the retroactivity question so important, is that the
vitality of the criminal conviction endures long after the criminal process is complete. All it takes is some contact with immigration officials—whether initiated by the immigrant herself, as in Ms. Chaidez’s
case,209 or by some contact with the criminal system, even on a minor
offense210—for an old conviction to trigger adverse immigration consequences. Thus, a failure of crimmigration counsel may lie dormant
and fail to surface for years.211 The Supreme Court’s decision in
Chaidez would make or break the future for those who learned only
later that their important decision to plead guilty had been made without any understanding of the deportation consequences of a
conviction.
Chaidez thus offered the Court an opportunity to continue the project it had begun in Padilla—accommodating constitutional law to the
Mar. 20, 2013) (detailing the case of Luz de Alba Santos-Sanchez, put into immigration proceedings in 2012 based on a conviction for which she was sentenced to 8 days’ time served in 2008).
208. See Brief of the American Immigration Lawyers Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 206, at 12–14 (detailing the case of Jorge (George) Aguilar, who
was put in proceedings in 2010 and deported based on a 2004 conviction that had been expunged); see also infra Part IV (detailing case of Jose Rodriguez).
209. Brief for Active and Former State and Federal Prosecutors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 18–21, Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (No. 11-820) [hereinafter Brief for Active and
Former State and Federal Prosecutors] (detailing the case of “Mr. A,” who was put into immigration proceedings, based on a nine-year-old conviction, when he attempted to renew his lawful
permanent resident card); see also Jaghoori v. Lucero, Civil Action No. 1:11-cv-1076, 2012 WL
604019 (E.D. Va. Feb. 22, 2012) (detailing the case of Azim Abdul Jaghoori, who was detained
and put into immigration proceedings based on a 1995 conviction when he re-entered the country after traveling abroad in 2009), abrogated by Hosh v. Lucero, 680 F.3d 375 (4th Cir. 2012).
210. See, e.g., Santos-Gonzalez v. Reno, 93 F. Supp. 2d 286, 287–88 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (detailing
the case of Jose Dimas Santos-Gonzalez, a lawful permanent resident whose arrest for turnstile
jumping in 1998 led to him being found deportable for a conviction from 1986); Keo v. Lucero,
No. 1:11cv614, 2011 WL 2746182, at *1 (E.D. Va. July 13, 2011) (detailing the case of Rigian Keo,
who was taken into custody in January 2011—“an event surely triggered by his December 14,
2010 arrest for malicious wounding, which was ultimately nol prossed”—for deportation based
on a 2003 conviction), abrogated by Hosh, 680 F.3d 375; Martinez-Cardenas v. Napolitano, No.
C13-0020-RSM-MAT, 2013 WL 1990848 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 25, 2013) (detailing the case of Federico Martinez-Cardenas, arrested in 2012 for charges later dismissed, but delivered to federal
custody via an immigration detainer and put into immigration proceedings based on 2006 conviction), report and recommendation adopted, No. C13-0020-RSM, 2013 WL 2006940 (W.D. Wash.
May 13, 2013).
211. Additionally, Congress can attach immigration consequences to a criminal conviction
well after the fact, with retroactive effect. See generally Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive
Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97 (1998); Adriane Meneses,
Comment, The Deportation of Lawful Permanent Residents for Old and Minor Crimes: Restoring
Judicial Review, Ending Retroactivity, and Recognizing Deportation as Punishment, 14 SCHOLAR
767, 829–40 (2012) (suggesting Padilla allows application of criminal ex post facto doctrine in
immigration proceedings). This also creates the possibility that a criminal conviction long dormant will be given new life in deportation proceedings.
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realities of crimmigration law. In Padilla those realities caused the
Court to recognize a right to effective crimmigration counsel. Chaidez
would determine whether the Court would afford the opportunity for
redress to immigrants whose claims were triggered by events that predated Padilla but surfaced only later.
The context of the case also presented the Court with the chance to
continue what it had begun in Danforth—stepping away from “retroactivity” and toward “redressability,” with redressability decisions
framed in terms of the policy considerations underlying the Griffith/
Teague redressability rules, rather than in terms of the scope of a constitutional rule. Chaidez’s case, after all, arose not in federal habeas
review of a state court judgment (the context for which the Teague
rule was designed), but rather in federal postconviction proceedings to
review a federal judgment. Danforth had specifically reserved the
question of whether Teague applied in such proceedings,212 and
Chaidez argued in the Supreme Court that Teague should not apply in
this context, “at least with respect to claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel that depend on evidence outside the trial record.”213
Chaidez first pointed out that the comity concerns underlying
Teague are not present in federal review of a federal criminal judgment.214 As for finality, Chaidez acknowledged that “some interest in
repose” was present in federal postconviction proceedings like hers.215
But she urged the Court to find the finality concerns underlying
Teague were adequately addressed in two ways. First, Chaidez noted
that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are properly raised for
the first time in postconviction proceedings, and that unlike claims
presented in federal habeas proceedings to review state-court judgments, such claims are not presented for “repeated” litigation.216 Second, Chaidez argued that the standard for judging ineffectiveness
claims—the Strickland test the Padilla Court applied to claims of ineffective crimmigration counsel—embodied finality protections that
rendered Teague superfluous.217 For both these reasons,218 Chaidez
212. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 269 n.4 (2008). The Court specifically reserved the
question of whether Teague applies in proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, id., whereas Chaidez
pursued relief via a petition for writ of coram nobis. The parties in Chaidez acknowledged that
there was no relevant difference between the two procedures. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1106 n.1.
213. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 166, at 27.
214. Id. at 28–29.
215. Id. at 31.
216. Id. at 29–31. See infra Part IV.
217. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 166, at 31–33. See infra Part IV.A.4.
218. Chaidez raised additional arguments concerning “administrative problems” with applying Teague in the context presented, which I do not address here. Brief for Petitioner, supra
note 166, at 34–39.
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argued the finality concerns present in Teague were not present in her
case, and Teague should not be applied.
Chaidez presented a thoughtful analysis of the extent to which comity and finality concerns were presented by her case. And she pointed
out that the Court had never decided that Teague applied in the federal postconviction context.219 The Court, however, brushed off
Chaidez’s arguments, holding them not properly preserved for the
Court’s consideration.220 (Chaidez had not presented her arguments
that Teague did not apply in her petition for certiorari or in the Seventh Circuit until her petition for rehearing.221 Her argument in her
response brief was limited to demonstrating that Padilla merely applied Strickland and did not fashion a “new” constitutional rule.222)
The Court extended Teague’s application to a federal postconviction
proceeding for the first time without considering the valid arguments
for not doing so. It did so despite the fact that the Court has previously considered Teague’s applicability when not raised by the parties—for example, in Teague itself, where the question of retroactivity
had only been raised in an amicus brief.223 It did so despite the fact
that both parties had fully briefed the issue of Teague’s applicability.224 It did so by ignoring the reasoning of the district court that had
219. Id. at 27. In Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998), the Court appeared to assume
Teague’s applicability in proceedings to vacate a federal conviction brought pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255. The parties had not raised the Teague issue, but an amicus brief urged the Court
to apply Teague. Id. at 619. The Court held Teague inapplicable because the “new” law relied
upon by Bousley was a decision in which the Court interpreted a criminal statute, not a new
“constitutional rule[] of criminal procedure.” Id. at 619–20 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288, 310 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
220. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1113 n.16 (2013).
221. Id.
222. Brief of Defendant/Appellee Roselva Chaidez, Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684
(7th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-3623).
223. Teague, 489 U.S. at 300 (plurality opinion) (holding “sua sponte consideration of retroactivity is far from novel”); cf. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 619 (considering applicability of Teague even
when raised only in amicus brief).
224. In Teague, the Court noted that while the parties had not briefed the issue of retroactivity with respect to the fair cross-section claim raised by Teague, they had briefed retroactivity
with respect to the Batson claim raised. Teague, 489 U.S. at 300 (plurality opinion). The parties’
briefs addressing Batson retroactivity did not bear at all on the questions the Court proceeded to
address, however. The Court launched its inquiry into retroactivity based on an amicus brief
that urged the Court to avoid the merits of Teague’s fair cross-section claim on retroactivity
grounds. Id. at 300–01. It then proceeded to dispense with the Linkletter rule for retroactivity,
which had hitherto been applied in cases on federal habeas review, and construct an entirely new
retroactivity jurisprudence. Id. at 301. Here, by contrast, both parties fully briefed the issue of
whether Teague should apply in the specific context presented by Chaidez. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 166, at 27–39; Brief for the United States at 25–53, Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. 1103
(No. 11-820). Amicus briefs also briefed the issue. See Brief of Amicus Curiae National Ass’n
of Federal Defenders in Support of the Petitioner at 7–8, Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (No. 11-820)
(arguing Teague’s underlying policies did not favor its application in Chaidez’s case); Brief
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held in Chaidez’s favor, partly on the grounds raised by Chaidez.225
And it did so by ignoring its own teachings in Danforth, that Teague is
a rule of redressability, informed by “equitable and prudential considerations” concerning the scope of federal habeas relief.226
Those equitable and prudential considerations clearly would have
favored Roselva Chaidez in this particular case. She raised her ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim at the proper procedural moment,
in the court of her conviction, and through the correct procedural vehicle227—just as Padilla had. (A challenge to her claim as time-barred
was properly rejected by the district court.228) She raised her claim
before Padilla was decided, Padilla was announced while her claim
was pending, and the district court ruled on her claim after Padilla was
decided. Given this procedural posture, the comity and finality concerns behind the Teague rule were nowhere in sight, and equitable
and prudential considerations favored redress. To paraphrase the district court, if Padilla was entitled to redress, Chaidez should have been
as well.229
It is clear that the Court could have addressed the issues raised by
Chaidez concerning Teague’s applicability in the context of her case.
Arguably, this should have been the threshold issue in Chaidez. By
choosing instead to ignore the “equitable and prudential considerations,” as well as the finality and comity interests, relevant to determining whether to extend the Teague rule to ineffective assistance
claims properly first raised in federal postconviction proceedings, the
Chaidez Court significantly undermined the Court’s careful decision
in Danforth.
The Chaidez Court accomplished this in a single sentence of the
opinion, broadly and falsely claiming, without supporting authority or
reference to Danforth, that Teague bars application of a “new rule” in
a “habeas or similar proceeding.”230 Danforth had been clear that
Teague was fashioned for the specific context of federal habeas review
of state-court criminal judgments. The Chaidez Court’s very next senAmici Curiae of Habeas Scholars and Constitutional Accountability Center in Support of Petitioner at 6–12, Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (No. 11-820).
225. See supra notes 186–199.
226. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 278 (2008).
227. See United States v. Chaidez, No. 03 CR 636-6, 2010 WL 3979664, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
6, 2010) (explaining the use of coram nobis).
228. Id. at *3 (holding that Chaidez had been diligent in bringing her claim and that laches did
not bar relief).
229. United States v. Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d 896, 903 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (“[I]f Chaidez’s claim
is barred by Teague, Padilla’s claim should have been barred as well.”).
230. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1107 (2013).
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tence completed the evisceration of Danforth: “Only when we apply a
settled rule may a person avail herself of the decision on collateral
review.”231 The use of these vague, imprecise phrases—“collateral review” and “habeas or similar proceeding”—undid the Danforth
Court’s understanding that not all collateral review is the same, and
not all collateral review is similar to federal habeas review of statecourt judgments. Danforth stood for the principle that because it was
redressability, not retroactivity, that was at stake, different procedural
contexts might benefit from different redressability rules. Chaidez’s
willingness to turn a blind eye to Chaidez’s arguments seemed to signal a return to retroactivity.232
Chaidez established, and the district court understood, that the procedural context of her claim was different—in ways relevant to the
underlying policy concerns animating the Teague rule—from the procedural context for which Teague was fashioned. Instead of addressing these arguments, the Court turned to the question of whether the
Padilla rule was a “new” constitutional rule. Like the district court,233
other lower courts had concluded that Padilla merely applied Strickland in the crimmigration context.234 The Supreme Court, however,
231. Id.
232. Previously I offered two reasons for the Court’s choice to leave Chaidez’s arguments
unaddressed. I wrote:
On the one hand, it appears the Court may have lost its way, and forgotten the truths of
Teague expounded just four years ago in Danforth. Even more dismal, it may be that
the Court was simply so eager to shut off the flow of Padilla claims that it was willing to
ignore the implications of the procedural posture of Roselva Chaidez’s case when it
granted certiorari.
Christopher N. Lasch, Chaidez: Ignoring Precedent & Procedural Posture, CRIMMIGRATION (Feb.
26, 2013, 9:04 AM), http://crimmigration.com/2013/02/26/chaidez-ignoring-precedent—procedural-posture.aspx. To these I would add the following possible explanations. Perhaps the Court—
misled by the question presented in Chaidez’s certiorari petition, see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 106, at i (“The question presented is whether Padilla applies to persons whose
convictions became final before its announcement.”)—failed to vet the petition and understand
that the procedural context of the case would not permit resolution of the question presented.
Perhaps the Court simply wanted to reach the question of whether Padilla was a “new rule” and
was not willing to wait for a state court case to come up through federal habeas review (the
context in which Teague would have been obviously applicable). Finally, the explanation may be
simply that changes in personnel on the Court since 2008 have weakened the Court’s commitment to Danforth’s nuanced understanding of retroactivity and redressability.
233. See Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 900–04.
234. E.g., United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 641 (3rd Cir. 2011) (holding that “because
Padilla followed directly from Strickland and long-established professional norms, it is an ‘old
rule’ for Teague purposes”); Commonwealth v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892, 901 (Mass. 2011) (holding that Padilla was “not a ‘new rule’ but merely an application of Strickland”); Denisyuk v.
State, 30 A.3d 914, 925 (Md. 2011) (determining, as a matter of state retroactivity law, that
Padilla did not announce a “new” rule); see also Michael Hartley, Note, What’s New Is Old
Again: Why Padilla v. Kentucky Applies Retroactively, 18 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC.
JUST. 95, 132 (2011) (arguing Padilla was a straightforward application of Strickland and there-
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held that before Padilla applied Strickland it first “considered a
threshold question: Was advice about deportation ‘categorically removed’ from the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel because it involved only a ‘collateral consequence’ of a conviction,
rather than a component of the criminal sentence?”235 Indeed, the
Court explained, it had been compelled to address this threshold question by the plethora of lower court decisions that had drawn the distinction between direct and collateral consequences, and the
uncertainty that prevailed on the question of whether such a distinction was relevant to resolution of claims of ineffective crimmigration
counsel.236
The Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit, holding Padilla to be a new
constitutional rule. Because Chaidez had not raised the question of
whether Padilla was a watershed rule, the Court did not address it.237
Danforth, of course, instructs that Chaidez does not bind the
states.238 Even states that apply the Teague framework in state postfore not a new rule); Murphy, supra note 11 (same); Syré, supra note 11 (same); Matthew A.
Spahn, Comment, Padilla Retroactivity: A Critique of the Tenth Circuit’s Ruling that Padilla Does
Not Apply Retroactively to Cases on Collateral Review [United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d
1147 (10th Cir. 2011)], 51 WASHBURN L.J. 767 (2012) (same); Allison C. Callaghan, Comment,
Padilla v. Kentucky: A Case for Retroactivity, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 701 (2012) (same); Gary
Proctor & Nancy King, Post Padilla: Padilla’s Puzzles for Review in State and Federal Courts, 23
FED. SENT’G REP. 239, 240–41 (2012) (suggesting the “weight of emerging authority” was against
Padilla being a “new” rule).
235. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1108 (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010)).
236. Id. (holding that because the “preliminary question about Strickland’s ambit came to the
Padilla Court unsettled[,] . . . the Court’s answer (‘Yes, Strickland governs here’) required a new
rule”). Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg in dissent, found this unconvincing. See
id. at 1120 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the majority reaches the paradoxical conclusion that by declining to apply a collateral-consequence doctrine the Court had never
adopted, Padilla announced a new rule”); cf. Michael S. Vastine, Trying (& Failing) To Find
Logic in Chaidez, CRIMMIGRATION (March 4, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://crimmigration.com/2013/03/
04/trying-and-failing-to-find-logic-in-chaidez-v-holder.aspx (noting that finding Padilla to be a
“new” rule “required some logic that surprises and does not convince me”). Assessing the merits of the “new” rule debate in Chaidez is beyond the scope of this Article. What is important for
present purposes is the indeterminacy of the “new rule” analysis. See infra Part IV.B.1.
237. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1107 n.3. Additionally, although the Court did not explicitly reserve this issue, it has been suggested that the Padilla rule, to the extent it encompasses affirmative misadvice, may not be a “new” rule at all. See Fisher & Turner, supra note 8, at 44.
238. As Maryland’s highest court noted in its pre-Chaidez decision holding Padilla retroactive
as a matter of state law: “[E]ven if the Supreme Court ever were to hold that Padilla is not
retroactive under Teague, that holding would have no adverse effect on our analysis here.”
Denisyuk, 30 A.3d at 925 n.8.
Given its express reservation of the issue, Chaidez does not even bind the lower federal courts
in determining whether Teague applies to ineffective crimmigration counsel claims brought in
federal postconviction proceedings. While the remainder of this Article focuses on Padilla retroactivity in state postconviction proceedings, the same analysis would apply to federal postconviction proceedings. See Lasch, supra note 110, at 65–68 (arguing that federal postconviction is
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conviction proceedings are not obligated to do so, and therefore may
alter that framework to suit state interests in providing or limiting
redressability.239 While the Chaidez Court may have taken a step
back from confronting the realities of crimmigration, including its
opening of a new “market” for mass incarceration of people of
color,240 the states need not and ought not do so.
IV. WHAT REDRESSABILITY RULES SHOULD GOVERN CLAIMS
INEFFECTIVE CRIMMIGRATION COUNSEL BROUGHT IN
STATE POSTCONVICTION PROCEEDINGS?

OF

What redressability rules should the states adopt that will be consistent with the realities of the crimmigration system, while also balancing the states’ conflicting interests in the finality of criminal judgments
and in redressing constitutional violations? Consideration of two of
the cases recently presenting this question to a state’s highest court
will provide a factual underpinning to help answer this question.241
Martin Ramirez (New Mexico)
In 2009, Martin Ramirez learned that his 1997 misdemeanor convictions in New Mexico would result in his deportation to Mexico.242 Mr.
Ramirez had sought to have the Department of Homeland Security
waive these grounds of inadmissibility, in part because of the hardship
his deportation would cause his daughter, Anita, a U.S. citizen.243 By
the end of March 2009, Mr. Ramirez’s daughter had moved in with
him, and Mr. Ramirez was providing Anita financial support as well as
taking care of her two daughters while Anita pursued her
education.244
more properly analogized to state postconviction, in determining finality and comity interests,
than it is to federal habeas review of state court judgments).
239. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 275 (2008) (holding that states may “provide remedies for a broader range of constitutional violations than are redressable on federal habeas”); see
also Denisyuk, 30 A.3d at 924 n.8.
240. See Vargas-Vargas, supra note 45, at 357–58 (arguing that incarceration stemming from
the war on drugs has “no growth potential,” but that “prison companies can justify the building
of new prisons based on a whole new kind of prisoner: the illegal alien, and more specifically, the
‘Mexican’ ” (emphasis omitted)).
241. Both of the cases I discuss here were recently decided, as is detailed below. I discuss the
cases not for their ultimate holdings, however, but rather because the facts of these two exemplary cases provide a useful framework for exploring the numerous considerations state courts
must grapple with in addressing the Padilla retroactivity question.
242. Record Proper at 6–8, Ramirez v. State, No. 33,604, 2014 WL 2773025 (N.M. June 19,
2014) (on file with author) (Decision on Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility,
dated June 22, 2009).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 8.
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Unsuccessful with DHS, Mr. Ramirez filed a petition for writ of
coram nobis245 in New Mexico’s Second Judicial District Court in Bernalillo County, seeking to vacate his convictions.246 At a hearing on
the petition, the court accepted Mr. Ramirez’s allegations—that but
for the failure of his court-appointed counsel to advise him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea, he would have not entered
a guilty plea—as admitted.247 The sole point of contention was
whether the constitutional rule announced in the 2004 New Mexico
Supreme Court decision in State v. Paredez248—that criminal defense
counsel has a duty to provide competent counsel regarding the immigration consequences of criminal convictions—is a “new” constitutional rule that should not be applied in postconviction proceedings.249
On January 13, 2010, the district court held the Paredez rule could not
be applied in Mr. Ramirez’s proceedings.250
Mr. Ramirez appealed. While his appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky,251 which confirmed what
the New Mexico Supreme Court had decided in Paredez in 2004: defense counsel has an obligation to provide competent advice to a client who may suffer adverse immigration consequences as a result of a
guilty plea in a criminal case. The court of appeals held the Paredez
and Padilla rules are not new constitutional rules, but rather “extensions of a previously entrenched duty to provide representation and
are retroactive.”252 The court of appeals further held the State’s failure to contest Mr. Ramirez’s factual allegations meant that Mr. Ramirez “completely established ineffective assistance of counsel and
245. In New Mexico, a criminal defendant who is in custody or otherwise under restraint
(such as probation) due to a criminal conviction, may petition for a writ of habeas corpus. N.M.
R. CRIM. P. 5-802(A). For a criminal defendant like Mr. Ramirez, who is no longer under restraint, a motion to vacate pursuant to Civil Rule 1-060(B) (the equivalent of what used to be a
petition for writ of coram nobis) is the appropriate postconviction vehicle. See State v. Barraza,
267 P.3d 815, 817–19 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011). Mr. Ramirez’s petition for writ of coram nobis was
construed by the New Mexico Court of Appeals as a Rule 1-060(B) motion. State v. Ramirez,
278 P.3d 569, 570 (N.M. Ct. App.), aff’d, 2014 WL 2773025.
246. See Record Proper, supra note 242, at 1–9 (on file with the author) (petition and attachments); id. at 10–12 (amended petition).
247. See Transcript at 3–5, State v. Ramirez, No. CV-2009-10638 (N.M. 2d Jud. Dist. Ct. Jan.
13, 2010) (on file with the author).
248. State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 804 (N.M. 2004). Like Roselva Chaidez, Mr. Ramirez
brought his postconviction action before Padilla was decided.
249. Cf. Kersey v. Hatch, 237 P.3d 683, 691 (N.M. 2010) (applying Teague in state postconviction proceedings).
250. Record Proper, supra note 242, at 31.
251. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010).
252. State v. Ramirez, 278 P.3d 569, 570 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d, No. 33,604, 2014 WL
2773025 (N.M. June 19, 2014).
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prejudice,” and remanded the case with instructions to allow Mr. Ramirez to withdraw his guilty plea.253
The New Mexico Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for
review.254 Oral arguments were held on January 14, 2014, and the
case was decided on June 19, 2014.255
Jose Rodriguez (Tennessee)
Jose Rodriguez is a Mexican citizen who was lawfully residing in
Tennessee when he was charged with patronizing prostitution.256
When a settlement offer was extended that would include expungement after a period of diversion, Rodriguez accepted the offer on the
advice of his lawyer, who told him he should take it because his record
would be expunged.257 Rodriguez’s lawyer did not know that an expunged conviction can trigger deportation.258 In September 2007
Rodriguez entered his guilty plea.259 He completed the period of diversion and the conviction was expunged in January 2010.260
On March 31, 2011 (one year after Padilla was decided), Rodriguez
filed a postconviction petition261 alleging his lawyer failed to properly
investigate the immigration consequences of his plea and gave Rodriguez “erroneous[] advice encouraging [him] to enter a guilty plea.”262
Because Rodriguez’s petition was filed more than one year after his
conviction became final, his petition alleged Tennessee’s one-year
statute of limitation263 should not apply because his petition was filed
253. Id. at 576.
254. State v. Ramirez, 294 P.3d 1244 (N.M. 2012).
255. Ramirez, 2014 WL 2773025 (holding, as a matter of state law, that the rule announced in
Paredez (and presumably Padilla) was not a new rule). On March 17, 2014, before Ramirez was
decided by the state supreme court, the New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed its course, stating that “Ramirez’s holding that Padilla could be retroactively applied was reversed by the
United States Supreme Court in Chaidez v. United States.” State v. Trammell, No. 31,097, 2014
WL 1998972, at *5 (N.M. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2014) (citation omitted). In light of the New Mexico
Supreme Court’s decision in Ramirez, the New Mexico Court of Appeals may need to visit the
question yet again.
256. Technical Record on Appeal at 3, State v. Rodriguez, No. M2011-01485-CCA-R3-PC
(Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 24, 2011) (on file with author). This is categorized as a “crime involving
moral turpitude.” Id. at 4 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2012)). See generally 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(2)(D)(ii) (“Any alien who . . . directly or indirectly procures or attempts to procure . . .
prostitutes or persons for the purpose of prostitution . . . is inadmissible.”).
257. Technical Record on Appeal, supra note 256, at 3–4.
258. Id. at 4.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 13.
261. The petition was filed pursuant to the Tennessee Post-Conviction Procedure Act, TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-30-101 to -122 (2012).
262. Technical Record on Appeal, supra note 256, at 5.
263. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-102(a).
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within one year of Padilla and Padilla had “applied Strickland v.
Washington . . . to the facts in Padilla retroactively.”264 The trial
court, however, held that since no appellate court had held Padilla to
have retroactive effect, Rodriguez’s petition was time-barred.265
The court of criminal appeals affirmed. The court first held that
“post-conviction relief is not available from an expunged record because there is no conviction to challenge.”266 But even if an expunged
conviction could be attacked in postconviction proceedings, the court
(citing to a string of decisions holding Padilla not retroactive) held
Mr. Rodriguez’s petition untimely.267 The Tennessee Supreme Court
accepted review.
After oral argument,268 the court decided the case on other
grounds.269
***
These cases represent two core truths about crimmigration. Martin
Ramirez, like Roselva Chaidez and many others, found himself in immigration proceedings years after his criminal case was over. A recent
study demonstrates the pervasiveness of old convictions used as the
basis for deportation. More than 50,000 people in a recent 16-month
period were the subjects of immigration detainers based on criminal
convictions more than 5 years old, and nearly 25,000 people were subject to detainers based on convictions more than 10 years old.270
Jose Rodriguez’s case exemplifies a second truth about crimmigration—its failure to live up to its stated priorities. Although the crimi264. Technical Record on Appeal, supra note 256, at 2–3; see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30102(b)(1) (providing that if a postconviction claim is “based upon a final ruling of an appellate
court establishing a constitutional right that was not recognized as existing at the time of trial,”
and “retrospective application of that right is required,” the postconviction action may be filed
“within one (1) year of the ruling of the highest state appellate court or the United States supreme court establishing a constitutional right that was not recognized as existing at the time of
trial”).
265. Technical Record on Appeal, supra note 256, at 14–16.
266. Rodriguez v. State, No. M2011-01485-CCA-R3-PC, 2013 WL 59449, at *3 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Jan. 7, 2013).
267. Id. at *4.
268. Oral Argument, Rodriguez v. State, M2011-01485-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Oct. 2, 2013),
available at https://www.tncourts.gov/courts/supreme-court/arguments/2013/10/02/jose-rodriguezaka-alex-lopez-v-state-tennessee.
269. Rodriguez v. State, No. M2011-01485-SC-R11-PC, 2014 WL 1347085 (Tenn. April 24,
2014) (holding that an expunged conviction is not susceptible to postconviction attack).
270. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, FEW ICE DETAINERS TARGET SERIOUS CRIMINALS (2013), available at http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/330 (reporting that
nearly half of those immigration detainers issued on the basis of a past conviction during the
period of study were based on a conviction more than five years old).
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nal-to-immigration pipeline is supposed to channel serious criminals
into deportation,271 in fact most persons enter the pipeline like Jose
Rodriguez, with no conviction at all or at most a minor conviction.272
The ensnaring of immigrants based on nothing more than minor
charges has been a leading factor spurring resistance to local involvement in federal immigration enforcement.273
In the crimmigration system, minor crimes, even dismissed and expunged crimes, can be the entry point, often years later, into a pipeline that “virtually inevitabl[y]” leads to the “‘drastic measure’ of
deportation or removal”274 that the Court has recognized as “an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty” for those crimes.275 These truths highlight the importance of the
Padilla retroactivity question, and its uniqueness.
A. Griffith, Not Teague, Should Govern Padilla Claims Properly
First Raised in State Postconviction Proceedings
Examining the application of Teague with these cases in mind demonstrates the Teague antiretroactivity rule ought not to be applied to
Padilla claims properly brought in state postconviction proceedings.
The principles animating Teague’s rule—comity and finality—are simply not applicable. Comity is not a concern where a state court is
reviewing a state-court judgment.276 And, as is shown below, finality
concerns do not favor denying redress in the context of a state postconviction proceeding in which the petitioner asks the postconviction
court to apply or develop277 a new constitutional rule278 to a claim of
271. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
272. See TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 270, at tbls.2 & 3
(reporting that 47.7% of those subject to detainers over a 16-month period had no criminal
conviction, and 17% were convicted of a “Level 3” offense carrying a sentence of less than a
year; only 23% had a “Level 1” conviction).
273. In King County, Washington, for example, a resolution limiting detainer compliance recited the fact that over a three-year period 78% of detainers received at the adult jail targeted
persons with no prior criminal history. King County, Wash., Ordinance No. 17706 (Dec. 2,
2013), available at http://mkcclegisearch.kingcounty.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=1445647&
GUID=19C2080B-1877-43FA-9B5B-B725F94F428D&Options=ID%7cText%7c&Search=20130285. Similarly, a resolution passed in Miami-Dade County, Florida, recited that 57% of detainers received in 2011 and 61% in 2012 did not involve a felony charge. Miami-Dade County, Fla.,
Res. No. R-1008-13 (Dec. 3, 2013), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/192144641/MDC-Resolution-on-ICE-Detainers-Official-Clerk-Copy-Passed-December-3-2013.
274. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010) (quoting Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S.
6, 10 (1948)).
275. Id. at 364 (footnote omitted).
276. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 279 (2008).
277. The Teague rule acts to bar a court from granting redress based on the application of a
new rule announced in another decision, but it also bars a court from developing a new rule and
granting redress upon it. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989) (plurality opinion).
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ineffective assistance of trial counsel.279 While the policies underlying
Teague are inapplicable, the principles supporting redressability articulated in Griffith are fully present. State postconviction courts
should apply the Griffith rule of redressability, rather than Teague’s
antiredressability rule, in these cases.
1. The Temporal and Procedural Dimensions of Finality
Before considering whether the finality concerns behind the Teague
antiretroactivity rule support its application in state postconviction
proceedings, it is important to undertake some dissection of finality.280
Finality is often invoked as a monolithic, impenetrable value to be
balanced against the value of correcting errors in criminal cases.281
Indeed, that was how finality was deployed in Teague itself. After
noting that finality was a well-established value in civil cases,282 the
Court went on to find finality “essential to the operation of our criminal justice system.”283 The Teague Court’s limited elaboration of finality revealed a view that finality would attach at a given time in the
life of a criminal case and attain a prominence over error correction
that would be nearly insuperable.284 Quoting Professor Bator, the
Court wrote: “[I]f a criminal judgment is ever to be final, the notion of
legality must at some point include the assignment of final competence
278. For the purpose of discussing finality, I assume arguendo that Padilla announced a “new
rule,” as the Court held in Chaidez. But state courts are not bound by Chaidez and may reach
their own conclusions as to whether Padilla announced a “new rule.” The indeterminacy of what
constitutes a “new rule” is one of many compelling reasons to dispense with the Teague inquiry
altogether. See infra Part IV.B.1.
279. Chaidez specifically failed to address the claim that “Teague should not apply to ineffective assistance claims.” Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1113 n.16 (2013). It is therefore possible that the United States Supreme Court will apply Teague consistent with the
principles set forth here. State courts need not wait for the Supreme Court to decide the issue,
particularly since, as is demonstrated herein, the interests at stake when ineffective assistance of
counsel claims are brought in state postconviction proceedings are different from the interests
animating the Teague rule in federal habeas corpus proceedings to determine the validity of state
court judgments.
280. A valuable contribution has been recently made to the discourse on finality. See Andrew
Chongseh Kim, Beyond Finality: How Making Criminal Judgments Less Final Can Further the
“Interests of Finality,” 2013 UTAH L. REV. 561.
281. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982) (stating that “[i]n appropriate cases [comity and
finality] must yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration”).
282. Teague, 489 U.S. at 308 (plurality opinion) (“[I]t has long been established that a final
civil judgment entered under a given rule of law may withstand subsequent judicial change in
that rule.”).
283. Id. at 309.
284. Teague’s two pro-retroactivity rules, the substantive due process and the “watershed”
rules, see supra Part III.A, are the only circumstances Teague recognized in which the need to
apply a new constitutional rule would overcome finality once it has attached.
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to determine legality.”285 Teague accordingly adopted a fixed procedural “trigger point”—the end of direct review—for application of
Teague’s antiretroactivity rule.286
Teague’s selection of a single trigger point comported with the
Court’s recital of only a single justification (borrowed from Professor
Bator) for valuing finality: “Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.”287 But closer examination of
the sources Teague relied on to support its emphasis on finality288
reveals that the monolithic value of finality can be broken down into
two distinct values that I will call “temporal finality” and “procedural
finality.”
Temporal finality is the perceived value in having criminal proceedings conclude within as short a time as possible. Professor Bator, for
example, believed that a “statutory time limit” for seeking federal
habeas review would be justified, since the passage of time might be
accompanied by “loss of evidence or absence or death of witnesses,
which may . . . effectively bar retrial of the case.”289 Similarly, Judge
Friendly emphasized the value of temporal finality, noting that “[t]he
longer the delay, the less the reliability of the determination of any
factual issue giving rise to the [collateral] attack,” the less the likelihood of a retrial even taking place, and the less accurate the retrial if
it does take place.290
Procedural finality, on the other hand, arises not with the passage of
time but with a litigant’s opportunity to raise a constitutional claim.
285. Teague, 489 U.S. at 309 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added) (quoting Bator, supra note
126, at 450–51).
286. Id. at 310. The Teague trigger point is discussed in more depth below. See infra Part
IV.B.2.
287. Teague, 489 U.S. at 309 (plurality opinion).
288. Elsewhere I have suggested that Teague’s concern with finality may be overblown. See
Lasch, supra note 110, at 57–60. That argument is not necessary to show that Teague ought not
be imported into state postconviction proceedings.
289. Bator, supra note 126, at 517.
290. Friendly, supra note 126, at 147. Justice Harlan made the same points. See Mackey v.
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 691 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and
dissenting in part) (noting that retrial after a grant of the habeas writ “compels a State that
wishes to continue enforcing its laws against the successful petitioner to relitigate facts buried in
the remote past through presentation of witnesses whose memories of the relevant events often
have dimmed” and “may well, ironically, produce a second trial no more reliable as a matter of
getting at the truth than the first”). The Supreme Court has recognized the temporal value of
finality in crafting other habeas doctrines. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637
(1993) (adopting a rule requiring the habeas petitioner to demonstrate “actual prejudice” from
constitutional error, because retrial after habeas grant “imposes significant ‘social costs,’ including . . . the ‘erosion of memory’ and ‘dispersion of witnesses’ that accompany the passage of time
and make obtaining convictions on retrial more difficult” (quoting United States v. Mechanik,
475 U.S. 66, 72 (1986)).
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Professor Bator’s critique of federal habeas jurisdiction was leveled
principally at the relitigation of constitutional issues.291 He made explicit exceptions to his argument, first where “no opportunity at all
was provided to litigate a question,” and second where the “conditions
under which a question was litigated were not fairly and rationally
adapted for the reaching of a correct solution.”292 In the first instance,
Professor Bator would have permitted initial litigation of the question
on collateral review; in the second he would have permitted relitigation.293 Likewise, Judge Friendly—who argued broadly that finality
was sufficiently valuable that collateral attack should be available only
to those who asserted their actual innocence—made exceptions to this
rule both where “collateral attack is the [first and] only avenue for the
defendant to vindicate his rights” and also where a state does not provide “proper procedure” in the initial forum for litigating the constitutional claim.294
Although the Teague Court did not differentiate between these two
finality values, there is strong evidence that Teague is rooted in procedural—not temporal—finality. First, Teague is one in a series of Supreme Court decisions crafting judicial “defenses” to the habeas
writ,295 each of which were primarily rooted in procedural finality.296
Indeed the Court declined to craft a judicial defense to the writ that

291. See Bator, supra note 126, at 451 (asking, “[I]f a proceeding is held to determine the facts
and law in a case, and the processes used in that proceeding are fitted to the task in a manner not
inferior to those which would be used in a second proceeding, so that one cannot demonstrate
that relitigation would not merely consist of repetition and second-guessing, why should not the
first proceeding ‘count’?”).
292. Id. at 455.
293. Id.
294. Friendly, supra note 126, at 152–53.
295. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (barring review in a second or subsequent
habeas petition of claims that should have been raised in an earlier petition); Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (establishing rule that claims not presented to state courts in accordance with state procedural rules would be deemed “procedurally defaulted” and not susceptible
to litigation in federal habeas review absent a showing of cause and prejudice).
296. Like in Teague, the Court’s decision in Wainwright did not support its rule by reference
to the specific harms identified with temporal finality. In McCleskey v. Zant, the Court identified its abuse-of-the-writ doctrine as “implicat[ing] nearly identical concerns” as addressed by
the procedural default doctrine set forth in Wainwright. McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 490–91. The
Court did mention the harms to a retrial after a habeas grant, due to “erosion of memory” and
“dispersion of witnesses,” associated with temporal finality. Id. at 491. But, at the end of the
day, the fact that “both the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine and our procedural default jurisprudence
concentrate on a petitioner’s acts to determine whether he has a legitimate excuse for failing to
raise a claim at the appropriate time,” id. at 490, demonstrates that procedural finality is the
necessary precondition to these doctrines.
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would explicitly and primarily serve temporal finality.297 Second, the
Teague decision did not advert to the harms occasioned by the passage
of time—the hallmark of temporal finality.298 Third, Teague delineated the trigger point for its antiretroactivity rule in procedural rather
than temporal terms.299
The attention to procedural finality (and inattention to temporal finality) in Teague is consistent with the thinking of the authors who
influenced the Court’s decision. While Professor Bator and Judge
Friendly valued both temporal and procedural finality, for them the
procedural value clearly trumped the temporal value. Temporal finality was part of their justification for curtailing collateral review,300 but
it was insufficient unless accompanied by procedural finality.301 And,
while Professor Bator favored setting time limits for collateral attack,
which would explicitly serve the temporal finality value, here again
temporal finality was insufficient without procedural finality; Professor Bator would have excepted from any time limits the raising of a
claim which could not have been raised within the allotted time and
therefore had not attained procedural finality.302
In considering whether and how the Teague antiretroactivity rule
should be applied in state postconviction proceedings, then, procedural finality should be the principal concern.303
2. Padilla Claims and Procedural Finality Concerns
The Teague rule’s concern with procedural finality cannot be divorced from the precise context in which it was forged. Federal
habeas review of state-court judgments addresses claims that have already been subject to one full round of litigation in state court, typically including adjudication in a trial court as well as one or more
appellate courts.304 But most states have rules in place to ensure that
297. Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 214 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that unlike
the other judicially created defenses, “no time limitation—not even equitable laches—was imposed [in federal habeas proceedings] to vindicate comity and finality”).
298. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308–10 (1989) (plurality opinion).
299. Id. at 310.
300. See supra notes 289–290 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 128–133 and accompanying text.
302. Bator, supra note 126, at 517 n.204 (“Of course I would not suggest imposing such a limit
in cases where the whole point of affording a collateral jurisdiction is to enable prisoners to raise
federal claims not previously available to them.”).
303. While some Padilla claims strongly implicate temporal finality concerns, those concerns
do not justify application of the Teague antiretroactivity rule. Other rules—statutes of limitation
or the doctrine of laches—are explicitly suited to serve temporal finality. See infra Part IV.A.2.a.
304. The doctrines of exhaustion and procedural default, both referenced in Teague, 489 U.S.
at 297–99, generally require that a habeas petitioner have subjected his or her constitutional
claims to a full round of review in the state courts before bringing them in a habeas petition.
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postconviction proceedings are not a forum for relitigation of constitutional claims.305 Ineffective assistance of counsel claims in general,
and Padilla claims in particular, are properly brought in postconviction proceedings for an initial round of adjudication.306
a. Other Procedural-Finality-Serving Doctrines that Channel
Claims to the Right Forum at the Right Time
Most states have finality-serving doctrines to ensure that claims are
raised at the appropriate time and by the appropriate procedural vehicle. These doctrines serve both temporal and procedural finality;307
claims must be brought in a timely manner and are not subject to endless relitigation.
Generally the failure to bring a constitutional claim at the earliest
possible moment can result in what is commonly called “waiver” or
“procedural default.” Constitutional claims that could have been, but
were not, raised on direct review may be dispensed with in postconviction proceedings under this doctrine.308 The doctrine, by definition,
serves the procedural finality value, which arises when a litigant has
the opportunity to raise a constitutional claim.
A claim that has been raised and decided on direct appeal may be
subject to a res judicata or direct estoppel bar in postconviction proceedings.309 While the waiver doctrine forces claims to be brought as
305. See infra Part IV.A.2.a.
306. See infra Part IV.A.2.b.
307. The possibility of new immigration consequences attaching retroactively to old criminal
convictions, see supra note 211 and accompanying text, turns state interests in temporal and
procedural finality on their ear. It makes little sense to accord a criminal conviction “finality”
when new consequences can still spring from it. Where Congress has attached new immigration
consequences to an old conviction, the retroactive application of such consequences should justify retroactive application of criminal doctrines affecting the validity of the conviction. Cf.
Meneses, supra note 211 (arguing that Padilla suggests Congress ought not be permitted to attach immigration consequences retroactively).
308. The doctrine is codified by statute in Tennessee. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-106(g)
(2012) (generally holding a claim waived “if the petitioner personally or through an attorney
failed to present it for determination in any proceeding before a court of competent jurisdiction
in which the ground could have been presented”). New Mexico provides exceptions to the rule,
evidencing circumstances in which the procedural finality value is not dominant. “A habeas
corpus petitioner will not be precluded . . . from raising issues . . . that could have been raised on
direct appeal either when fundamental error has occurred, or when an adequate record to address the claim properly was not available on direct appeal.” Duncan v. Kerby, 851 P.2d 466, 468
(N.M. 1993) (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Campos v. Bravo, 161 P.3d 846, 852 (N.M. 2007)
(holding that although the record was adequate for litigation of the constitutional claim on direct
appeal, the claim was of fundamental error and therefore could be reviewed in habeas proceedings despite a failure to raise the claim on direct appeal).
309. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 823 N.E.2d 1256, 1260 (Mass. 2005) (“We conclude that principles of direct estoppel operate as a bar to the defendant’s attempt in her rule
30(b) motion to relitigate issues in her motion to suppress.”).
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early as possible, the direct estoppel doctrine serves procedural finality310 by ensuring that postconviction proceedings are not a second
round of litigation for claims raised in earlier direct review or postconviction311 proceedings.
Together, these doctrines result in a finely calibrated set of procedures to channel constitutional claims to the proper forum at the
proper time. While the waiver doctrine forces claims to be brought as
early as possible, the res judicata doctrine prevents relitigation, generally ensuring that postconviction proceedings are not a second round
of litigation for claims raised in earlier direct review or postconviction
proceedings. The finality concerns underlying Teague are amply, precisely, and completely served by these doctrines—and state-specific
variations on these doctrines represent the balancing of the state interest in correcting constitutional error against the state interest in
procedural finality.
Some jurisdictions use the doctrine of laches to serve temporal finality concerns. For example, when Roselva Chaidez filed her postconviction action in 2009 seeking to vacate her 2004 conviction,312 the
government sought to bar Chaidez from postconviction relief through
the doctrine of laches.313 The district court found, though, that
Chaidez brought her postconviction action promptly after learning of
the adverse immigration consequences caused by her guilty plea.314
Other jurisdictions have addressed temporal finality concerns by
placing a time limit on when a first postconviction action can be
brought. Tennessee, for example, has a one-year statute of limitations
for postconviction actions.315 While such time limits certainly serve
310. Here again, New Mexico law evidences a weakened interest in procedural finality, as
compared to the state’s apparent interest in constitutional error correction. New Mexico does
not adhere to a strict rule of res judicata. If a “habeas petitioner can show that there has been an
intervening change of law or fact, or that the ends of justice would otherwise be served, principles of finality do not bar relitigation of an issue adversely decided on direct appeal.” Clark v.
Tansy, 882 P.2d 527, 532 (N.M. 1994); see also Duncan, 851 P.2d at 469 (describing “res judicata
in the habeas corpus setting as an equitable, discretionary, and flexible judicial doctrine” and
suggesting that the opportunity for full factual development of a claim during the direct review
track is an important factor for the postconviction court to consider in deciding whether to apply
res judicata).
311. See Manlove v. Sullivan, 775 P.2d 237, 241 (N.M. 1989) (noting that “collateral estoppel
principles may, at the discretion of a subsequent habeas corpus court, prevent relitigation of
issues argued and decided on a previous habeas corpus petition”).
312. See supra notes 183–204.
313. Government’s Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Writ of Error Coram
Nobis, supra note 189, at 5–6.
314. United States v. Chaidez, No. 03 CR 636-6, 2010 WL 3979664, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6,
2010).
315. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-102(a) (2012).
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the state interest in finality, they are by nature blunt instruments. Accordingly, most time limitations contain explicit exceptions to allow
claims to be brought where delay is not attributable to the defendant.316 Tennessee’s statute of limitations contains no such exception,
however, suggesting Tennessee apparently values, at least for purposes of postconviction actions, temporal finality more than procedural finality.317 Because Jose Rodriguez filed his postconviction motion
in 2011, some three-and-a-half years after his guilty plea, the trial
court found his motion would be time-barred.318
In New Mexico, by contrast, the postconviction petition filed by
Martin Ramirez was subject to no statutory limitations period. Although the rule pursuant to which Mr. Ramirez pursued postconviction relief requires action to be taken “within a reasonable time,”319
the New Mexico Supreme Court has construed the rule as imposing
no statute of limitations.320 The court’s decision, finding it “only logical that a void conviction cannot be vitalized by the lapse of time,”321
demonstrates a higher value assigned to constitutional error correction than to temporal finality.
Importing the Teague antiredressability rule does not adequately
address state finality concerns. Under the Teague rule, finality is the
dominant concern once direct review is complete. As is shown here,
the Teague rule is not calibrated to consider claims properly raised in
postconviction proceedings, and results in the denial of a forum and
elimination of state courts’ participation in shaping federal constitutional doctrine.322
316. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) (2014) (allowing exception to one-year time
limit where “the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and
could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence”); KY. R. CRIM. P. 11.42(10)(a)
(allowing similar exception to three-year statute of limitations for postconviction action).
317. There is no “discovery” rule in Tennessee whereby a postconviction litigant who was not
aware of the factual basis of her constitutional claims can avoid strict application of the statute of
limitations. Passarella v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 625 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (“This Court refuses to engraft a discovery rule over the statute of limitations in post-conviction cases.”).
318. Technical Record on Appeal, supra note 256, at 14–16.
319. Mr. Ramirez pursued relief by filing a petition for writ of coram nobis, which the New
Mexico Court of Appeals treated as a motion made pursuant to New Mexico Civil Rule 1060(B). State v. Ramirez, 278 P.3d 569, 570 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012) (citing State v. Barraza, 267
P.3d 815 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d, No. 33,604, 2014 WL 2773025 (N.M. June 19, 2014)). By
the terms of Rule 1-060(B), such a motion must be made “within a reasonable time.” See N.M.
R. CIV. P. 1-060(B)(6); see also State v. Tran, 200 P.3d 537, 542 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (construing
petition for writ of coram nobis as a motion pursuant to Rule 1-060(B)(4)).
320. State v. Romero, 415 P.2d 837, 840 (N.M. 1966).
321. Id.
322. See infra Part IV.A.3–5.
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b. Padilla Claims—Properly Raised for Initial Adjudication in
Postconviction Proceedings
A Padilla claim—that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to advise a criminal defendant of the adverse immigration consequences
attendant to a guilty plea—is among the class of claims that cannot
normally be adjudicated on direct review.323 Most states permit, or
even prefer, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to be raised for
the first time in postconviction proceedings.324 Because such claims
generally require investigation and fact development not available
during direct review, the appellate record is generally insufficient to
review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.325
For precisely these reasons, the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that ineffective assistance claims are properly brought for the
first time in postconviction proceedings.326 Noting that “‘[r]ules of
procedure should be designed to induce litigants to present their contentions to the right tribunal at the right time,’” the Court held that
penalizing litigants for not raising ineffectiveness on direct appeal
“would have the opposite effect, creating the risk that defendants
would feel compelled to raise the issue before there has been an opportunity fully to develop the factual predicate for the claim.”327
323. As noted above, most states employ a waiver doctrine to prevent litigants from raising
claims in postconviction proceedings that ought to be raised on direct review. See supra Part
IV.A.2.a.
324. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Zinser, 847 N.E.2d 1095, 1098 (Mass. 2006) (“[O]ur courts
strongly disfavor raising claims of ineffective assistance on direct appeal.”); State v. Arrendondo,
278 P.3d 517, 529 (N.M. 2012) (noting that the New Mexico Supreme Court “prefers that these
claims be brought under habeas corpus proceedings”); Kendricks v. State, 13 S.W.3d 401, 405
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (holding that the postconviction court erred in barring petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims for failure to raise them on direct appeal).
325. See, e.g., Duncan v. Kerby, 851 P.2d 466, 468–69 (N.M. 1993) (“The rationale is that even
assuming that a criminal defendant has a new attorney to handle his direct appeal, the record
before the trial court may not adequately document the sort of evidence essential to a determination of trial counsel’s effectiveness because conviction proceedings focus on the defendant’s
misconduct rather than that of his attorney.”); State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 806 (N.M. 2004)
(“[W]hen the record does not contain all the facts necessary for a full determination of the issue,
‘an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is more properly brought through a habeas corpus
petition . . . .’ ” (quoting State v. Roybal, 54 P.3d 61, 67 (N.M. 2002))); Kendricks, 13 S.W.3d at
405 (noting that the court had “previously warned defendants and their counsel of the dangers of
raising the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal because of the significant of [sic] amount of development and factfinding such an issue entails,” and citing cases);
Thompson v. State, 958 S.W.2d 156, 161–62 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (describing the raising of
ineffective assistance on direct appeal as a “practice fraught with peril” because of the possibility
that the claim will be decided without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing, and citing cases).
326. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003).
327. Id. at 504 (alteration in original) (quoting Guinan v. United States, 6 F.3d 468, 474 (7th
Cir. 1993) (Easterbrook, J., concurring)).
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In short, an ineffectiveness claim typically relies on facts that “are
dehors the record and their effect on the judgment was not subject to
consideration and review on appeal.”328 Both Professor Bator and
Judge Friendly, whose views on finality were ultimately enshrined in
Teague, excluded such claims from their broader view that finality
should foreclose collateral review of criminal judgments.329 Professor
Bator specifically excluded claims involving denial of the right to
counsel,330 of which a claim of ineffective assistance is a subspecies.
Both Professor Bator and Judge Friendly excluded claims involving
defects in a guilty plea.331 A claim that a guilty plea was caused by
ineffective assistance of counsel is a claim that the plea was rendered
involuntary by virtue of counsel’s deficient performance.332
3. Martinez v. Ryan—Procedural Finality for Claims Properly First
Raised in Postconviction Proceedings
The U.S. Supreme Court recently recognized, in its 2012 decision in
Martinez v. Ryan,333 that in assessing the finality interest owing to a
state-court adjudication challenged on federal habeas review, claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel brought properly for the first time
in postconviction proceedings should be treated as though they were
being pursued on direct review.
Martinez concerned the application of the procedural default doctrine, which—like Teague—serves interests in comity and procedural
finality that arise when a federal court reviews a state-court judgment
in habeas proceedings. In Martinez, the Court considered whether the
procedural default of failing to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel could be excused by the absence or ineffectiveness of
postconviction counsel.334 Ordinarily, the absence or deficiency of
328. Friendly, supra note 126, at 152 (quoting Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104–05 (1942)).
329. See Jaclyn Kelley, Note, To Plea or Not To Plea: Retroactive Availability of Padilla v.
Kentucky to Noncitizen Defendants on State Postconviction Review, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 213,
230–35 (2012) (noting the unfairness of applying the Teague bar to ineffectiveness claims raised
in state postconviction proceedings).
330. Bator, supra note 126, at 458.
331. See id. at 457 (indicating claims involving coerced guilty pleas could properly be brought
in postconviction proceedings); Friendly, supra note 126, at 152 (same for guilty plea procured by
improper means).
332. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56–57 (1985) (holding that where defendant enters a
plea upon the advice of counsel the voluntariness of the plea is determined by the test for ineffective assistance of counsel).
333. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
334. Id. The procedural default doctrine requires a litigant to raise the claim in the proper
way, according to state law. That, and the fact that the rule is relaxed where a litigant can show
“cause” for not doing so, indicate that it is procedural finality, not temporal finality, that is
served by the procedural default rule.
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counsel is recognized as “cause” to excuse a procedural default in
state court proceedings only if it amounts to a denial of the constitutional right to counsel.335 And because generally there is no constitutional right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings, the Court
had held in Coleman v. Thompson that the absence or deficiency of
postconviction counsel would not constitute cause for a procedural
default.336
But in Martinez the Court reassessed this calculus. The Martinez
Court began by noting that the procedural default rule is among those
rules, specific to federal habeas corpus review of state court judgments, “designed to ensure that state-court judgments are accorded
the finality and respect necessary to preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our system of federalism.”337 Nonetheless, finality did
not carry the day—precisely because Martinez’s claim of ineffective
trial counsel would have been properly brought for the first time in
postconviction proceedings. “Where, as here, the initial-review collateral proceeding is the first designated proceeding for a prisoner to
raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial,” wrote the Court, “the
collateral proceeding is in many ways the equivalent of a prisoner’s
direct appeal as to the ineffective-assistance claim.”338
In light of the similarities between direct review proceedings and
“initial-review collateral proceedings” presenting the first opportunity
to raise a claim, the Court essentially imported the rules for direct
review proceedings. Thus, because absent or ineffective counsel on
direct review will constitute cause to excuse a procedural default, the
same rule applies to absent or ineffective counsel on postconviction
review of a claim properly brought for the first time in postconviction
proceedings—even though the absence or ineffectiveness does not in
that instance amount to a constitutional denial of counsel.
Martinez confirms that Padilla claims of ineffective crimmigration
counsel that are properly raised for the first time in postconviction
proceedings do not implicate procedural finality any more than claims

335. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991).
336. Id. at 752–53.
337. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1316.
338. Id. at 1317 (emphasis added). In Trevino v. Thaler, the Court held that the Martinez rule
applies in jurisdictions that do not require ineffectiveness claims to be brought in postconviction
proceedings, if the “state procedural framework, by reason of its design and operation, makes it
highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to raise a
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal.” Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct.
1911, 1921 (2013).
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raised on direct review.339 Finality, the principal policy consideration
that might support application of the Teague rule here, is absent. Instead, Martinez demonstrates that because claims of ineffectiveness
are generally encouraged to be brought in postconviction proceedings
for the first time, it is the policy reasons underlying the Griffith rule of
retroactivity that are implicated when a Padilla claim is so presented:
“the opportunity to . . . obtain an adjudication on the merits of his
claims.”340
As the Court wrote in Griffith, “the nature of judicial review requires that we adjudicate specific cases, and each case usually becomes the vehicle for announcement of a new rule.”341 This “basic
norm[] of constitutional adjudication”342 supported the Griffith
Court’s determination that a rule of redressability must apply to cases
on direct review, and is no less applicable to postconviction actions in
which Padilla claims are raised. Just as absent or ineffective postconviction counsel in Martinez was deemed cause to excuse a procedural
default because it threatened the opportunity for “an adjudication on
the merits,” even so would applying Teague’s antiredressability rule to
Padilla claims brought in postconviction proceedings render state
courts powerless to reach the merits of many such claims. The Griffith
redressability rule is appropriate in this instance, to ensure that claims
properly brought for the first time in postconviction proceedings are
brought in a forum capable of reaching the merits.

339. Chaidez raised this argument to the United States Supreme Court, see Brief for Petitioner, supra note 166, at 27–33, and I have argued previously that in Chaidez the Court had an
opportunity to rule on a basis more principled than the Teague “new rule” inquiry allowed. See
Christopher N. Lasch, Symposium: Chaidez and the Crumbling Foundations of the Teague Rule,
CRIMMIGRATION (Nov. 1, 2012, 4:04 AM), http://crimmigration.com/2012/11/01/chaidez-and-thecrumbling-foundations-of-the-teague-rule.aspx; see also Fisher & Turner, supra note 8, at 43–44.
For a searching analysis and presentation of the argument that Padilla claims should not be
subject to the Teague analysis when properly presented for the first time on postconviction review, see generally Sharpless & Stanton, supra note 11. The argument can be extended beyond
Padilla claims to any claim properly presented for initial adjudication in state postconviction
proceedings. See Lasch, supra note 110, at 44–46 (noting that “state and federal postconviction
proceedings . . . provide an initial forum for the litigation of certain constitutional claims” such as
ineffective assistance of counsel, government suppression of exculpatory evidence, and juror
misconduct); see also id. at 49 (arguing that for such claims “the selection of a ‘trigger point’
before the claims may even be raised makes little sense”).
340. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317.
341. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987).
342. Id.
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4. Procedural Finality Protections Embodied in the Substantive Law
Governing Padilla Claims
The Teague antiredressability rule is superfluous given the claim at
issue here, ineffective assistance of counsel, which has built-in safeguards to protect the finality of criminal judgments. Both the deficient performance and prejudice components of the legal standard
safeguard a state’s procedural finality interest. The Teague antiredressability rule is unnecessary given these protections.
Strickland v. Washington343 established the now-familiar two-part
test for ineffective assistance of counsel. Padilla in turn relied on
Strickland, which requires a defendant to prove not only that trial
counsel’s performance was deficient, but also that there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.”344
Both prongs of the Strickland test protect finality. In evaluating
whether counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient, Strickland eschews a post hoc judgment: “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the
distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of
counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”345 Reviewing courts are thus explicitly
instructed not to consider evolving standards of performance—by this
requirement, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are already frozen in amber.346
The Strickland Court’s discussion announcing the standard for assessing deficient performance indicates the Court was motivated by its
concern with the finality of judgments: “The availability of intrusive
post-trial inquiry into attorney performance or of detailed guidelines
for its evaluation would encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness
challenges. Criminal trials resolved unfavorably to the defendant
would increasingly come to be followed by a second trial, this one of
343. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
344. Id. at 694.
345. Id. at 689 (emphasis added); see also id. at 690 (instructing postconviction courts to
“judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case,
viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct” and measured against “prevailing professional
norms” (emphasis added)).
346. See Leading Case, Sixth Amendment—Assistance of Counsel—Retroactivity—Chaidez v.
United States, 127 HARV. L. REV. 238, 238 (2013) (“The jurisprudence that governs ineffective
assistance of counsel dictates a conclusive if imprecise timestamp when attorney deficiency outstrips constitutional bounds: the very moment prevailing norms of professional conduct deem it
so.”).
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counsel’s unsuccessful defense.”347 Teague’s antiredressability rule is
not required to serve finality concerns where the legal standard by
which claims are tested is specifically linked to the time of the alleged
error.
The Strickland Court also included a prejudice component in announcing the test for ineffective assistance of counsel. Here the Court
explicitly considered finality. The Court rejected the idea that counsel’s deficient performance should merit automatic reversal, with no
prejudice requirement, and instead sought to fashion a test that would
identify errors of counsel “sufficiently serious to warrant setting aside
the outcome of the proceeding.”348 The Court also rejected a
prejudice test that would require a defendant to demonstrate
prejudice by a preponderance of the evidence. The Court noted that
such a test would “reflect[] the profound importance of finality in
criminal proceedings,”349 but decided that “[a]n ineffective assistance
claim asserts the absence of one of the crucial assurances that the result of the proceeding is reliable, so finality concerns are somewhat
weaker and the appropriate standard of prejudice should be somewhat lower.”350
Thus, in calibrating the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, the
Court explicitly considered the finality owed to state-court judgments.
Superimposing a second finality-serving doctrine, the Teague antiredressability rule skews the fine balance struck by the Court in
Strickland. This is particularly so given that Teague gives overwhelming voice to finality, denying redress in nearly all claims brought after
the conclusion of direct review. The Strickland Court rejected this
overemphasis on finality in fashioning its prejudice prong.
5. State Courts’ Interest in Developing Constitutional Law for
Claims Properly Brought Initially in Postconviction
Proceedings
State courts, no less than federal courts, have the duty to adjudicate
federal constitutional claims.351 Importing Teague in this context
347. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
348. Id. at 693.
349. Id. at 693–94.
350. Id. at 694.
351. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby . . . .”); see also Arizona v. Evans, 514
U.S. 1, 8 (1995) (“State courts, in appropriate cases, are not merely free to—they are bound to—
interpret the United States Constitution.”); Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884) (“Upon
the State courts, equally with the courts of the Union, rests the obligation to guard, enforce, and
protect every right granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States . . . ; for the
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would deny state courts the important opportunity to discharge this
duty. It would prevent state courts from developing federal constitutional law concerning ineffective assistance of counsel (and all other
claims that are properly first brought in postconviction proceedings),
realizing Justice Harlan’s fear that a rule of prospectivity would reduce the lower courts “largely to the role of automatons, directed by
[the Supreme Court] to apply mechanistically all then-settled federal
constitutional concepts to every case before them.”352
Teague, when applied in federal habeas corpus proceedings, “eliminates a previously available federal forum in which state prisoners
may argue for new federal procedural rules.”353 Importing Teague
into state postconviction proceedings eliminates a state forum for doing so—a state forum that is all the more important for constitutional
development given Teague’s removal of a federal forum.
The importance of state court voices in developing federal constitutional law should not be underestimated. The Supreme Court relies
on state courts to serve as proving grounds for constitutional arguments.354 Indeed, in Padilla the U.S. Supreme Court relied in part
upon New Mexico’s Paredez decision to support its decision that there
is no constitutional difference between an attorney’s misadvice and
non-advice concerning immigration consequences.355 But had
Paredez indeed been a “new” rule of constitutional law, a strict application of Teague in New Mexico postconviction proceedings would
have prevented New Mexico from announcing Paredez at all.
Application of Teague to claims properly presented initially in postconviction proceedings would effectively remove state courts’ voices
from the important ongoing dialogue over the shape and scope of federal constitutional rights. Indeed, applying Teague in this way runs
counter to the foundational premise of Teague. Justice Harlan bejudges of the State courts are required to take an oath to support that Constitution, and they are
bound by it . . . as the supreme law of the land, ‘anything in the Constitution or laws of any State
to the contrary notwithstanding.”).
352. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 680 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in part).
353. Lyn S. Entzeroth, Reflections on Fifteen Years of the Teague v. Lane Retroactivity Paradigm: A Study of the Persistence, the Pervasiveness, and the Perversity of the Court’s Doctrine, 35
N.M. L. REV. 161, 191 (2005).
354. See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 379 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (referring to the
Supreme Court’s practice of allowing “emerging constitutional issues” to “percolate” in the state
courts); see also Maryland v. Balt. Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 917–18 (1950) (noting that the
Supreme Court may deny certiorari to allow constitutional issues to be “further illumined by the
lower courts”).
355. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 370 (2010) (citing State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799,
804–05 (N.M. 2004)).
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lieved only comity and finality justified curtailing federal habeas review because a federal habeas court reviews constitutional claims that
have already been adjudicated in state court.
Justice Harlan recognized that relitigation of constitutional issues in
federal habeas proceedings might serve a “deterrence function,”356
“forcing trial and appellate courts in both the federal and state system
to toe the constitutional mark.”357 But this function might be adequately served (and tempered by comity), Justice Harlan believed, by
limiting federal habeas courts to applying constitutional rules that
were in effect at the time of the state-court adjudication.358 The Court
in Teague likewise counted among the “costs imposed upon the
State[s] by retroactive application of new rules of constitutional law
on habeas corpus”359 the “understandabl[e] frustrat[ion]” experienced
by state courts “when they faithfully apply existing constitutional law
only to have a federal court discover, during a [habeas] proceeding,
new constitutional commands.”360 Comity was thus deployed in
Teague to protect the ability of state courts to adjudicate federal constitutional issues and to incentivize them to do so faithfully.
The finality interest served by Teague also was premised on an initial adjudication of constitutional claims in state court. We have seen
that Justice Harlan, and ultimately the Court, relied on Professor Bator’s work. And Bator explicitly grounded his views in the capacity of
state-court judges to determine federal constitutional issues.
“[D]eciding federal questions is an intrinsic part of the business of
state judges,” Bator wrote.361 Permitting the relitigation of constitutional claims anew on federal habeas review, for Bator, would squander “all of the intellectual, moral, and political resources involved in
the legal system”—including any “sense of responsibility” among state
court judges.362
Whether cast in terms of comity or finality, the premise of Teague is
the availability of a forum in which state courts will adjudicate in the
first instance the merits of constitutional issues presented. Both Jus356. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262–63 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
357. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 687 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in
part).
358. Id. at 688–89.
359. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 654 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment)).
360. Id. (third alteration in original) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 n.33 (1982)).
361. Bator, supra note 126, at 510–11.
362. Id. at 451; see also id. at 506 (“The crucial issue is the possible damage done to the inner
sense of responsibility, to the pride and conscientiousness, of a state judge in doing what is, after
all, under the constitutional scheme a part of his business: the decision of federal questions properly raised in state litigation.”).
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tice Harlan and Bator justified imposing limits on federal habeas review by emphasizing that such review always occurs after a round of
litigation in which the state courts have had the opportunity to apply
federal constitutional law, subject to review by the U.S. Supreme
Court.363 Teague’s deference to state courts is premised on state
courts’ faithful discharge of this obligation, and upon the existence of
a full round of unlimited review, as the Griffith rule establishes, in
which constitutional innovation is permitted and even required.
***
Because Padilla claims of ineffective crimmigration counsel are
properly brought initially in state postconviction proceedings, they
should be subject to the principles supporting redressability articulated in Griffith v. Kentucky and not the antiredressability principles
behind Teague.
B. Avoiding the Problems that Have Plagued the Teague Rule
As is shown above, the Teague antiretroactivity rule is both inappropriate and unnecessary when applied to Padilla claims properly
brought for the first time in state postconviction proceedings.364 By
eschewing the Teague rule altogether, or modifying its application,
state courts can avoid the three principle problems that have plagued
administration of the Teague rule.
1. The Intractable “New Rule” Inquiry
The very first step of the Teague inquiry—whether a constitutional
rule is a “new rule,” triggering Teague’s antiredressability rule—has
363. [T]his Court’s function in reviewing a decision allowing or disallowing a writ of
habeas corpus is, and always has been, significantly different from our role in reviewing
on direct appeal the validity of nonfinal criminal convictions. While the entire theoretical underpinnings of judicial review and constitutional supremacy dictate that federal
courts having jurisdiction on direct review adjudicate every issue of law, including federal constitutional issues, fairly implicated by the trial process below and properly
presented on appeal, federal courts have never had a similar obligation on habeas
corpus.
Habeas corpus always has been a collateral remedy, providing an avenue for upsetting
judgments that have become otherwise final. It is not designed as a substitute for direct
review.
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 682–83 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in
part); see also, e.g., Bator, supra note 126, at 512 (referring to “federal questions already adjudicated by state courts and subject to Supreme Court review”).
364. See supra Part IV.A.
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drawn scathing criticism for its unpredictability.365 The perceived indeterminacy of the new rule inquiry has been the most persistent criticism. According to the authors of the seminal work on federal habeas
corpus, “[t]he inherent ambiguity of the term ‘new rule’ and the
Court’s repeated changes of direction in defining it have left the lower
courts floundering.”366 Some have claimed the new rule test has
served as little more than “a screen for covert rulings on the
merits.”367
One need look no further than New Mexico to appreciate the indeterminacy of Teague’s new rule inquiry. New Mexico’s appellate court
spent considerable intellectual resources determining that neither
Paredez nor Padilla announced a new rule of constitutional criminal
procedure.368
The court analyzed the new rule jurisprudence of
Teague and its progeny, the substantive law of Strickland and its progeny, this Court’s jurisprudence, and the Padilla decision itself, in concluding that Paredez and Padilla did not announce a new rule.369
Contrary to all of the signs apparent to the New Mexico court, the
Supreme Court in Chaidez held that Padilla did in fact announce a
new rule of constitutional criminal procedure.370 But state courts are
not required to follow Teague or Chaidez.371 They can avoid the inde365. See, e.g., John Blume & William Pratt, The Changing Face of Retroactivity, 58 UMKC L.
REV. 581, 588 (1990) (noting that Teague defines a “new rule” in two contradictory ways, each
representing one end of the “newness” spectrum); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer,
New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1742 (1991)
(describing the “new rule” inquiry as a “threshold uncertainty” contributing to the unpredictability of the Linkletter era).
366. 2 JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 25.5, at 993 (3d ed. 1998).
367. Id.; see also Tung Yin, A Better Mousetrap: Procedural Default as a Retroactivity Alternative to Teague v. Lane and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 25 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 203, 287 (1998) (“Teague and its progeny have failed to provide sufficient guidance for
determining when a rule is new, thus leaving federal courts a zone of discretion with which they
can make outcome determinative decisions without necessarily reaching the merits of the
claims.”).
368. See State v. Ramirez, 278 P.3d 569, 570–74 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d, No. 33,604, 2014
WL 2773025 (N.M. June 19, 2014).
369. Similarly, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 2011 concluded that “the reasoning and language of the Padilla decision itself” supported a conclusion that Padilla did not announce a “new rule.” Commonwealth v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892, 901 (Mass. 2011). A “fair
reading” of Padilla, the court concluded, “suggests that the Justices themselves assumed that
their holding would be retroactively applied.” Id. at 903.
370. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013); see also Leading Case, supra note 346, at
245–47 (2013) (arguing that “the Chaidez version of the Teague analysis of newness construed
the mere mention of the direct/collateral distinction as a contributing factor to the Padilla holding. . . . [T]he Chaidez gloss on Teague injects additional arbitrariness into the process, which is
now less tied to the substance of retroactivity policy than to the minutiae of opinion language,
structure, and argumentation.”).
371. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 269 (2008).
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terminacy of the new rule test by declining to apply Teague to claims
properly first raised in postconviction proceedings.
Alternatively, in applying the Teague framework to such claims,
state courts can adhere to a definition of new rule that recognizes the
lesser procedural finality interests at stake in state postconviction (as
opposed to federal habeas corpus) proceedings.372 Rather than focusing on whether a potentially new rule is “dictated by precedent,”373
for example, the New Mexico Court of Appeals in Mr. Ramirez’s case
hewed to the other end of the “newness spectrum,”374 focusing on
whether a potentially new rule is “flatly inconsistent [with] or explicitly contrary to precedent.”375
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court followed this same path
in Commonwealth v. Sylvain.376 While it continued to find the Teague
framework for determining retroactivity questions to be “sound in
principle,” the court noted it was entitled to apply that framework
independently and reach conclusions different from those reached by
the U.S. Supreme Court.377 The court specifically faulted the Supreme Court for adopting an increasingly broad definition of what
constitutes a new rule for purposes of the Teague antiretroactivity
analysis.378 Instead of asking whether the Padilla decision would have
been “apparent to all reasonable jurists” the court ultimately asked
whether “Massachusetts precedent at the time Padilla was decided
would have dictated an outcome contrary to that in Padilla.”379 Adhering to its pre-Chaidez analysis of the new rule question,380 and siding with Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Chaidez, the court held that
Padilla was not new, “for the simple reason that it applied a general
standard—designed to change according to the evolution of existing
professional norms—to a specific factual situation.”381
372. Cf. Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463, 470 (Nev. 2002) (indicating that the state would apply
the Teague “framework” but could deviate from federal determinations of Teague’s new rule
question).
373. See Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1110–11 (holding Padilla announced a new rule because “[n]o
precedent of our own ‘dictated’ the [result]” and the result “would not have been—in fact, was
not—‘apparent to all reasonable jurists’ prior to our decision” (quoting Lambrix v. Singletary,
520 U.S. 518, 528 (1997)).
374. See Blume & Pratt, supra note 365, at 588.
375. State v. Ramirez, 278 P.3d 569, 571–72 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d, No. 33,604, 2014 WL
2773025 (N.M. June 19, 2014).
376. Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 995 N.E.2d 760 (Mass. 2013).
377. Id. at 770 (citing Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493 (Minn. 2009)).
378. Id. at 769.
379. Id. at 771.
380. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
381. Sylvain, 995 N.E.2d at 770–71.
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Quoting Justice Sotomayor, the Sylvain court noted that Padilla was
driven not by changes in the Sixth Amendment, but in immigration
law.382 Sylvain represents one response to the rise of crimmigration
and the unique set of concerns crimmigration presents for retroactivity questions. Indeed, the New Mexico Supreme Court followed this
approach in Mr. Ramirez’s case, holding that the right to effective
crimmigration counsel had existed since at least 1990 in New Mexico
and was not a new constitutional rule.383
2. Selection of an Appropriate “Trigger Point” for Redressability
The Teague rule has also been criticized for the arbitrariness of using the conclusion of direct review as a “trigger point” to separate
those who will receive redress for a constitutional violation from those
who will not. As Justice White put it, “otherwise identically situated
defendants may be subject to different constitutional rules, depending
on just how long ago now-unconstitutional conduct occurred and how
quickly cases proceed through the criminal justice system.”384
Of course, any antiredressability rule requires a “trigger point—a
way of separating those who will benefit from a new decision from
those who will not,” and any trigger point “creates distinctions that
are subject to serious fairness objections; the only question is which
method has the fewest shortcomings.”385 Teague’s selection of the
close of direct review as a trigger point has a certain logic for claims
brought in federal habeas corpus proceedings challenging a state court
judgment: Teague gives effect to comity and finality concerns by
preventing relitigation in federal court, based on a (presumably more
favorable) new constitutional rule, of claims already decided in state
court.
State postconviction courts considering claims that have already
been raised and adjudicated on direct appeal could conceivably be
correct in applying Teague to such claims.386 But applying Teague’s
382. Id. at 768 (citing Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1116 (2013) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting)).
383. Ramirez v. State, No. 33,604, 2014 WL 2773025, at 1 (N.M. June 19, 2004). Like the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Sylvain, the New Mexico Supreme Court in Ramirez
aligned itself not with the Chaidez majority, but with Justice Sotomayor’s dissent. Id. at *5–6.
384. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 331 (1987) (White, J., dissenting); see also Schriro v.
Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358–66 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing use of Teague trigger
point in determining which death row inmates would benefit from the Court’s decision in Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)).
385. Toby J. Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments in Criminal Cases, 115 YALE L.J. 922,
987, 990 (2006).
386. See, e.g., Kersey v. Hatch, 237 P.3d 683 (N.M. 2010) (applying Teague to a claim that had
already been adjudicated on direct review). That a state court would permit relitigation in post-
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direct review trigger point to claims properly brought for the first time
in postconviction proceedings (like Padilla claims of ineffective crimmigration counsel) makes no sense at all. Such claims are not ordinarily properly brought on direct review,387 and the close of direct
review proceedings is a trigger point that is on the one hand completely unrelated to the claims to be decided, and on the other hand
guaranteed to deny litigants bringing these claims even one forum in
which the constitutional doctrine at stake may be developed. The
Teague trigger point applied to these claims is, to put it mildly, “subject to serious fairness objections.”388
Applying the Teague rule, with its trigger point at the close of direct
review proceedings, to claims properly brought first in state postconviction proceedings, makes no sense and works a positive unfairness
on the litigants. If state courts retain the Teague framework for such
claims, they should do so with a modification of the trigger point. Because claims properly brought for the first time in postconviction proceedings are analogous to those brought on direct review,389 the
finality concerns animating Teague are not triggered until the close of
postconviction review. The proper trigger point for an antiredressability rule like Teague’s, applied to such claims, would be the close
of postconviction review.
Such a trigger point would also ensure that the policies underlying
the Griffith rule of redressability are given effect throughout the first
full round of litigation of such claims. Just as the policies underlying
Griffith require redress for claims through the direct review track,
even so do they require redress for claims properly brought for the
first time in postconviction proceedings through the postconviction review track.
3. Teague’s Overly Narrow “Watershed” Rule
Applying the Teague rule in state postconviction proceedings imports a third much-criticized aspect of Teague: its overly narrow exception for watershed rules of constitutional criminal procedure. In
theory, Teague allows full redressability for such watershed rules. But
in practice, the Court has not recognized a single watershed rule since
conviction proceedings of such a claim suggests, however, a lessened state interest in procedural
finality under the circumstances.
387. See supra Part IV.A.2.b.
388. Heytens, supra note 385, at 990.
389. See supra Part IV.A.3 (discussing the reasoning of Martinez v. Ryan).
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Teague was announced.390 Teague’s watershed exception has been
criticized as being so narrow as to be “virtually non-existent,”391 and
assailed as relying upon “a deeply flawed epistemology.”392
The Teague watershed rule has two requirements—a new rule must
not only be “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” but it must
also be a rule that promotes the accuracy of the fact-finding process.393 The Teague decision imported the accuracy requirement despite the expressed views of Justice Harlan, whose views on
retroactivity were so influential on the Court. Justice Harlan endorsed the first watershed requirement—that a new constitutional
rule be “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”—but not the accuracy requirement. Although he had earlier favored an accuracy requirement, in Mackey Justice Harlan explicitly rejected it, in part
because he found “inherently intractable the purported distinction between those new rules that are designed to improve the fact-finding
process and those designed principally to further other values.”394
If state courts apply the Teague framework as a matter of state law,
they should modify the watershed exception as applied to claims properly first raised in postconviction proceedings. The state interest in
procedural finality is much greater when a state criminal judgment is
attacked in federal habeas corpus proceedings (in which case the
Teague rule governs) than it is when a litigant properly brings a Padilla claim of crimmigration counsel ineffectiveness for the first time
in state postconviction proceedings.395
The Teague rule, as noted above, was designed to serve interests in
comity and procedural finality. But due process requires that even
those interests must yield in the face of a sufficiently important new
constitutional rule. Teague thus recognized that violations of water390. As is discussed more fully below, see infra Part V, the Court has repeatedly pointed to
expansion of the right to counsel as the “paradigmatic example of a watershed rule of criminal
procedure.” Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 170 (1996).
391. Entzeroth, supra note 353, at 195–96; see also Kermit Roosevelt III, A Retroactivity Retrospective, with Thoughts for the Future: What the Supreme Court Learned from Paul Mishkin,
and What It Might, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1677, 1694 (2007) (“[N]o new procedural rule has yet
satisfied the Teague exception, and the Court has strongly intimated that none shall.”).
392. David R. Dow, Teague and Death: The Impact of Current Retroactivity Doctrine on Capital Defendants, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 23, 41 (1991).
393. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311–12 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey v.
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and
dissenting in part)).
394. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 695 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in
part); see also Bator, supra note 126, at 449 (urging a focus “not so much [on] the substantive
question whether truth prevailed” but on whether fair process had been afforded for determining the facts).
395. See supra Part IV.A.
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shed rules are so unjust as to outweigh not only the finality concerns
underlying Teague but the comity concerns as well.396 In state postconviction proceedings, where comity is not an issue and finality concerns are lessened,397 a different rule should pertain. Eliminating the
accuracy requirement of the Teague watershed exception, and adopting the watershed exception as proposed by Justice Harlan in his
Mackey opinion, strikes a more appropriate balance.
As is shown more fully below,398 the right to counsel has always
been considered a “bedrock procedural element” that is “implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty.” It has been on the second of Teague’s
requirements—the accuracy requirement criticized by Justice
Harlan—that some courts have grounded the conclusion that Padilla
is not a watershed rule.399 Applying the Teague framework as modified to eliminate the accuracy requirement, state courts should hold
that the Padilla rule, defining the scope of this most essential constitutional right, is a watershed rule when applied to claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel properly raised for the first time in state postconviction proceedings.
V.

PADILLA

AS

“WATERSHED” RULE

Even if state courts decline to modify the Teague watershed exception as applied to Padilla claims properly raised for the first time in
state postconviction proceedings,400 they should nonetheless conclude
that Padilla is a watershed rule.
Justice Harlan used the Gideon decision extending the right to
counsel to all felony cases as an example of a decision that “alter[ed]
our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements that must be
found to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction.”401 And U.S.
Supreme Court cases applying the Teague watershed exception repeatedly reference Gideon as the paradigmatic watershed rule.402 In
396. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 311–13 (plurality opinion).
397. See supra Part IV.A.
398. See infra Part V.
399. See, e.g., United States v. Mathur, 685 F.3d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that Padilla
does not “enhance the ‘accuracy of the factfinding process’ ” (quoting Whorton v. Bockting, 549
U.S. 406, 419 (2007))), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1457 (2013); United States v. Chang Hong, 671
F.3d 1147, 1158 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that “Padilla does not concern the fairness and accuracy of a criminal proceeding, but instead relates to the deportation consequences of a defendant’s guilty plea”).
400. See supra Part IV.B.3.
401. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693–94 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in part) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 349 (1963)).
402. See, e.g., Whorton, 549 U.S. at 419–21; Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417–18 (2004)
(“[L]awyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with crime
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Strickland, the Court specifically linked the effective assistance of
counsel to the reliability of the outcome, and in doing so explicitly
addressed the finality concerns which serve as a counterweight to declaring any rule a watershed rule: “An ineffective assistance claim asserts the absence of one of the crucial assurances that the result of the
proceeding is reliable, so finality concerns are somewhat weaker and
the appropriate standard of prejudice should be somewhat lower.”403
In its per curiam decision in McConnell v. Rhay in 1968, the Court
held that the right to counsel at sentencing must be given retroactive
effect. The Court did not distinguish between the right to counsel at
sentencing and the right to counsel at any other critical juncture in a
criminal case:
This Court’s decisions on a criminal defendant’s right to counsel at
trial, at certain arraignments, and on appeal, have been applied retroactively. The right to counsel at sentencing is no different. As in
these other cases, the right being asserted relates to “the very integrity of the fact-finding process.” . . . The right to counsel at sentencing must, therefore, be treated like the right to counsel at other
stages of adjudication.404

The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Missouri v. Frye405 and
Lafler v. Cooper406 concerning the Sixth Amendment right to effective
counsel during plea negotiations—including Padilla—reaffirm the
Court’s commitment to the right to counsel as a “bedrock procedural
element.” Just as it did in McConnell v. Rhay, the Court has rejected
in these recent cases a concern with accuracy that focuses only on the
result of the criminal trial, and recognized the reality of today’s criminal justice system:407
Because ours “is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of
trials,” it is insufficient simply to point to the guarantee of a fair trial
as a backstop that inoculates any errors in the pretrial process. “To
a large extent . . . horse trading [between prosecutor and defense
counsel] determines who goes to jail and for how long. That is what
to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in
ours.” (quoting Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344)); Kitchens v. Smith, 401 U.S. 847, 847 (1971) (per
curiam) (reversing state court judgment holding Gideon not retroactive, and holding “Gideon is
fully retroactive”).
403. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
404. McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2, 3–4 (1968) (per curiam) (citations omitted) (quoting
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965)).
405. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
406. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
407. For a discussion of the Court’s evolving recognition that the right to counsel embodies a
constitutional norm beyond simply guaranteeing a fair trial, see Christopher N. Lasch, “Crimmigration” and the Right to Counsel at the Border Between Civil and Criminal Proceedings, IOWA
L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
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plea bargaining is. It is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.” In today’s criminal justice
system, therefore, the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than the
unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical point for a
defendant.408

Chaidez instructs that Padilla is a new rule precisely because the
Court acknowledged that the Sixth Amendment’s reach extended to a
context to which the lower courts nearly unanimously held beyond
it.409 Padilla thus enlarged the scope of the right to counsel, just as
Gideon had when it extended the Sixth Amendment’s right to noncapital state court proceedings.410
Supreme Court jurisprudence thus suggests it is reasonable to believe the Court will treat the expanded scope of the Sixth Amendment
in Padilla as a watershed constitutional rule requiring retroactive application.411 While Teague’s watershed exception has been excoriated
by commentators who have criticized Justice O’Connor’s narrowing of
Justice Harlan’s formulation of the watershed exception in Mackey,412
one consistency between Justice Harlan’s Mackey opinion and the
Teague formulation is clear: An expansion of the right to counsel
clearly qualifies as a watershed rule no matter what test is used.413

408. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Lafler, 132 S.
Ct. at 1388; Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J.
1909, 1912 (1992)); see also Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1385–86 (reaffirming that the Sixth Amendment
does not exist solely to guarantee a fair trial, but extends its scope to pretrial and posttrial
proceedings).
409. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1109–10 (2013) (noting that the lower courts
“almost unanimously concluded that the Sixth Amendment does not require attorneys to inform
their clients of a conviction’s collateral consequences, including deportation” and that Padilla
“answered a question about the Sixth Amendment’s reach that we had left open”).
410. Cf. Lasch, supra note 407 (arguing that Padilla is a decision rule analogous to Strickland,
and therefore implicitly recognizes an unannounced Gideon-like rule expanding the right to
counsel).
411. In Chaidez, the Court noted that the question of whether Padilla was a watershed exception to the Teague rule was not before the Court. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1107 n.3.
412. See, e.g., Roosevelt III, supra note 391, at 1694 (“Teague combined the two Harlan formulations [from Desist and Mackey], an innovation with little obvious justification other than,
perhaps, that a conjunction is harder to satisfy than either element alone.”).
413. See Jennifer H. Berman, Comment, Padilla v. Kentucky: Overcoming Teague’s “Watershed” Exception to Non-Retroactivity, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 667, 672 (2012) (arguing that “the
Court has finally encountered the first new rule that qualifies under Teague’s seemingly insurmountable watershed exception”). But see, e.g., People v. Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d 887, 899 (Crim.
Ct. 2010) (holding Padilla not a watershed rule).
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The above analysis argues strongly in favor of all state courts affording redress for violations of the Padilla right to effective crimmigration counsel, at least where such claims are properly raised for
the first time in state postconviction proceedings.414 But illogic persists in the law. It does so not because of our incapacity but because it
serves inequality.
What is most likely to actually happen, then, despite this compelling
logic, is not a uniform granting of redress in the state courts.415 Instead, results will vary across jurisdictions.416 And the state interest
that will determine whether states apply Teague to bar litigants from
redress for Padilla violations will likely be neither the interest in temporal finality nor the interest in procedural finality. Rather, the determinative state interest will be the one most closely tied to the specific
context of this litigation—the state’s perceived interest in either fueling the crimmigration machinery or slowing it.
Those states that have attempted to supplement federal immigration enforcement efforts, by actively tying their criminal justice systems to the federal immigration removal system, have garnered the
most visible attention.417 Arizona, in particular, with its restrictionist
Senate Bill (S.B.) 1070, was at the center of a debate over whether
states ought to engage affirmatively in immigration enforcement.418
The Court’s rebuke in Arizona v. United States,419 holding S.B. 1070
preempted by federal law, will not end the debate.420 Arizona failed
to address the core issues that have emerged from the “crimmigration
414. See supra Parts IV–V.
415. The states have been nonuniform on the question of whether to adhere to Teague. Compare Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 499–500 (Minn. 2009) (adhering to Teague even after
Danforth v. Minnesota), and Rhoades v. State, 233 P.3d 61, 64 (Idaho 2010) (same), with State v.
Smart, 202 P.3d 1130 (Alaska 2009) (applying state law retroactivity test different from Teague),
and State v. Garcia, 834 N.W.2d 821 (S.D. 2013) (same). They have likewise been nonuniform in
determining whether, under Teague or a similar analysis, Padilla was a new rule. Compare State
v. Gaitan, 37 A.3d 1089, 1108 (N.J. 2012) (holding that “measured at the time of [a] guilty plea in
2008, Padilla was novel and unanticipated”), and Campos v. State, 816 N.W.2d 480, 490 (Minn.
2012) (holding Padilla to be a new rule), with Commonwealth v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892, 901
(Mass. 2011) (holding Padilla to be “merely an application of Strickland”).
416. See supra note 8.
417. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of
Immigration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251 (2011) (arguing pieces of state legislation
like Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and copycat measures are preempted).
418. See Lasch, Detainers After Arizona, supra note 34, at 640–46 (describing the rise of S.B.
1070 as a focal point for the debate over state participation in immigration enforcement).
419. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
420. See Lasch, Detainers After Arizona, supra note 34, at 700–02.
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crisis”—the disparate racial impact and racial profiling embedded in
the crimmigration system.421
Indeed it is precisely these aspects of crimmigration that have
spurred some jurisdictions down a path sharply different from Arizona’s. In response to concerns that the crimmigration system, and
particularly the “Secure Communities” program,422 engenders racial
profiling and disparate racial impact, a wave of jurisdictions has begun
to actively resist participation in immigration enforcement.423
The question of Padilla retroactivity may ultimately prove to be another battlefield in the ongoing war over crimmigration, as states’ dispositions toward, or against, the crimmigration system find expression
in answering the question whether their courts will provide redress for
Padilla violations. If so, Connecticut and New York, whose highest
courts will soon consider Padilla retroactivity, seem likely to afford
greater redress than the Teague rule would permit. Resistance to
crimmigration has been present in both states: the governor of New
York sought to “opt out” of Secure Communities in 2011,424 and Connecticut in 2013 became the first state to enact legislation restricting

421. See supra notes 40–47 and accompanying text (noting racial profiling and disparate impact concerns); see also Lasch, Detainers After Arizona, supra note 34, at 700 (noting the Court’s
avoidance of these issues in Arizona); Lasch, Preempting Detainers, supra note 34, at 291–93
(noting the “road not taken” in Arizona).
422. See supra Part II.A.
423. I have documented this phenomenon elsewhere at length, finding parallels between the
current wave of resistance to immigration detainers and the antebellum history of jurisdictions
resisting fugitive slave rendition. See generally Lasch, Rendition Resistance, supra note 34. In
2014, federal court decisions indicating that localities could be held liable for Fourth Amendment violations caused by prolonged detention pursuant to federal immigration detainers have
resulted in a spate of jurisdictions opting out of the crimmigration enforcement regime. See, e.g.,
SoCal Counties Halt Immigration Detainers After Court Ruling, CBS LOS ANGELES (June 2,
2014), http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2014/06/02/socal-counties-halt-immigration-detainers-aftercourt-ruling/.
424. See Editorial, Resistance Grows, N.Y. TIMES, (June 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/06/08/opinion/08wed1.html. The same occurred in Massachusetts, see id., where the Supreme Judicial Court ultimately found Padilla applies retroactively. See supra notes 376–382 and
accompanying text.
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the use of immigration detainers,425 the key enforcement tool of Secure Communities.426
Civil rights issues are not the only state interests at stake where
Padilla retroactivity is concerned. Prosecutors and police alike have
raised the concern that victim and community safety will be casualties
of the crimmigration system, as crime victims and witnesses are discouraged from reporting crime for fear of being ensnared in immigration proceedings.427 And prosecutors428 and judges lament the
disproportionate outcomes caused by crimmigration. The New Mexico trial judge, for example, who found himself bound by precedent to
deny redress for the admitted Padilla violation in Mr. Ramirez’s case,
expressed “a great deal of sadness” in issuing his ruling.429 “I am
deeply troubled given what we see on a daily basis,” he said, “not just
in this building, but the fact that something as minor as a possession of

425. An Act Concerning Civil Immigration Detainers, Pub. Act. No. 13-155, 2013 Conn.
Legis. Serv. 13-155 (West), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/ACT/pa/pdf/2013PA-00155R00HB-06659-PA.pdf; see also Luther Turmelle, Islas Freed Pending Deportation Appeal;
‘Double Victory’ as Malloy Signs TRUST Act into Law, NEW HAVEN REG., (July 19, 2013), http:/
/www.nhregister.com/general-news/20130719/islas-freed-pending-deportation-appeal-double-victory-as-malloy-signs-trust-act-into-law. The California TRUST (Transparency and Responsibility Using State Tools) Act, aimed at limiting the state’s compliance with federal immigration
detainers, was signed into law by the California governor on October 5, 2013. See Assemb. B. 4,
2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/asm/
ab_0001-0050/ab_4_bill_20131005_chaptered.pdf (text of bill). Similar legislation has been proposed in Florida, see S.B. 730, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013), Massachusetts, see H.B. 1613,
188th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2013), and Washington, see H.B. 1874, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Wash. 2013).
426. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. Detainer resistance was present in New
Mexico as well, where the supreme court found the right to effective crimmigration counsel
applies retroactively. See Ramirez v. State, No. 33,604, 2014 WL 2773025 (N.M. June 19, 2014).
The New Mexico counties of Taos and San Miguel were among the earliest jurisdictions to adopt
policies that limit compliance with federal immigration detainers. See MELISSA KEANEY ET AL.,
ISSUE BRIEF: IMMIGRATION DETAINERS AND LOCAL DISCRETION Exhibit E (2011), available at
http://www.nilc.org/document.html?id=103 (San Miguel County Detention Center Policies and
Procedures) (limiting compliance to cases where the prisoner targeted by an immigration detainer has been convicted of at least one felony or two misdemeanors); Id. Exhibit F (Taos
County Adult Detention Center Policies and Procedures) (same).
427. See Brief for Active and Former State and Federal Prosecutors, supra note 209, at 16–24;
see also Chris Burbank et al., Policing Immigration. A Job We Do Not Want, HUFFINGTON POST,
(June 7, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chief-chris-burbank/policing-immigration-a-jo_b_
602439.html (arguing that requiring state law enforcement involvement in immigration enforcement would “institutionalize racial profiling and biased policing—while depriving the public of
their safety”).
428. See Brief for Active and Former State and Federal Prosecutors, supra note 209, at 11–15
(arguing that failing to afford redress for Padilla claims denies prosecutors the opportunity to
serve “the State interest in a proportionate outcome” by agreeing to postconviction relief).
429. See Transcript, supra note 247, at 9–10.
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marijuana charge could result in a man’s deportation. That just,
frankly, blows my mind, in plain English.”430
Ultimately, then, it may be dissatisfaction with the states’ involvement in the crimmigration system that provides the impetus for states
to move away from the Teague antiredressability rule in state postconviction proceedings.

430. Id.

